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Summary  findings
Discussions  of economic reform in the Russian  Instead, barriers  to competition in Russia  arise  as a
Federation arc colored by the conventional view of  result  of highbly  segmented product  markets. In large part,
Russia's  industrial  strucrurc. Both in Russia and in the  this segmentation  can bc viewed  as a legacy  of central
Wesr,  Russian  industry is characterized  as very large  planning. Under the prior regime, enterprises  were
enterprises  operating in highly concentrated industries.  highly isolated,  divided along both ministerial  and
Brown, Icke  and Ryterman challenge  the  geographic  lines.  Presently,  these barriers are reinforced
conventional  view. They assess  Russian  industrial  by some fe&tures  of the transitional environment  that
concentration by comparing the Russian  industrial  continue to undermine the efficient  distribution of
structure (as revealed in the 1989 Soviet  Census of  goods.
Industry) with that in the United States and other  Brown, Ickes,  and Ryterman conclude that the
countries.  traditional policy  remedies  appropriate for problems of
They find that very large firms are more prevalent in  concentration (snxch  as antitrust policy  and import
the United States than in Russia.  This empirical  fact  compedtion) may be ill-advised  or inadequate  for
suggests  that planners  economized  on the costs of central  addressing  problems  of imperfect competition in the
economic  coordination  not by building  unusually large  Russian  economy.
enterprises,  but by not building  very  small enteprises.  They argue instead that improving  the distrbution
Their most important finding: That there is little  system and other market infrastructure  that supports
aggregate  or industry concentration at the national level  trade and facliting  the entry of new finns  should be the
in Russia.  Monopolies and oligopolics  actually  account  most critical elements  of competition policy  in Russia.
for only a small  share of national employment  and
production.
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1.  Introduction
Discussions  of economic  reform in the Russian  Federation  are colored by the conventional
view of Russian industrial  structure. This view, held both in  Russia and in the west, is that Russian
industry  is characterized  by very large enterprises  operating  in highly concentrated  industries. This
perception  of industrial  structure  has important  implications  for policy, and for the interpretation  of
developments  in Russia.'  For example,  based on the view that Russian industry  is dominated  by
monopoly  enterprises,  Russian  policymakers  have reintroduced  price controls  on a wide variety of
commodities.
The conventional  wisdom  about Russian industrial  structure  is based on a generation  of
research  on the Soviet  system  of central  planning, research  that appeared  to be supported  by available
evidence. According  to this view, planners  econoinized  on the costs of central  planning  by creating  a
highly concentrated  industrial  sector with a small number  of very large enterprises in each industry.
Before  transition,  the conventional  costs associated  with imperfect  competition  - higher  prices and
restricted  output  - could  be overcome  by the control  of prices and the setting  of output targets by
central  planners.  Now, however, as the Russian economy  adopts  the market  system, problems  of
industrial  structure  become  important  and affect  the design of econoric reftbmL Consequently,  it is
crucial  that the conventional  wisdom  be re-examined.
In this paper, we challenge  the conventional  wisdom. We estimate  Russian industrial
concentradon  by examining  the Soviet  Industrial  Census  of 1989, and by comparing  the Russian
industrial  structure  to that in the United  States and other countries. We find that the conventional
wisdom  about Russian industrial  structure  is seriously  misleading. We find, for example,  that very
large firms are more prevalent  in the United States  than in Russia, as are very small firms.  Our
analysis  suggests  that  planners  economized  on the costs  of central  economic  coordinauion,  not by
buiding wwsually large enterprises,  but by not buiding very small enterprises. Because  innovation
was centrally  directed, small  firms did not play the role they play in a market economy,  and thus
industry  evolved  under a completely  different  process of economic  selection.
Our most important  finding  is that there is little aggregate  or industry  concentration  at the
national  level in Russia.  Monopolies  and oligopolies  actually  account  for a very small share of
national  employment  and production. Our analysis  suggests  instead  that the barriers  to comperition  in
'A frequently  offered  explanation  of the output drop that fbllowed  price liberalizatipn  is that
monopolies  reduced  output to raise prices.ThduaWd  Concamtraooa
Russia arise as the result ofproduct  markets ta  are highly segmente'J? In large part,  this
segmentation  can be viewed.  as a legacy  of the system of central  planning. Nevertheless,  some
features  of the transition  environment  continue  to undermine  the efficient  distribution  of goods,
reinforcing  these barriers. Based on our finding, we conclude  that the traditional  policy  remedies
appropriate  for problems  of concentration,  such as anti-trust  policy  and import competition,  may be
ill-advised  or inadequate  for addressing  problems  of imperfect  competition  in the economy.  We
argue instead  that imwroving  the disbution  system  and  fiacilitating  the entry of new  firms are the
most critical elements  of competition  policy  in Russia.
The remainder  of the paper is as follows. In the rest of section 1, we focus on the process of
industrial  evolution  under central  planning. We also discuss  the conventional  wisdom, and explain
why we think a further examination  is warranted. Section  2 discusses  data and methodology. In
section  3, we present our findings  in the form of a series of "myths"  and wrealities."  We then turn,
in section  4, to analyze  the barriers to competition  that do exist in Russia  today.  Section  5 discusses
the implications  of our findings  for economic  reform in Russia. Section  6 concludes  the paper.
1.1  Industril  Evolution Under Central Planning
The industrial  structure  that exists  in the Russian  Federation  today was crealid mostly  as a
consequence  of decisions  made during the prior economic  regime. Therefore, we begin our
discussion  of industrial concentration  in Russia  by considering  the process of industrial  evolution
under central  planning. Some  of the  onfusion  that arises over the present industrial  structure  is a
direct consequence  of differences  in views over the important  features  of this process. We present
these two views below.
Much of the convenlonal  view about industrial  evolution  under central  planning  arises from a
particular  folk model (the 'cookie cutter" model) of planner  or ministerial  decision  making. In this
model, a Stalinist  minister  is assigned  the responsibility  of building a new industry. The minister.
studies  the set of technologies  available  to produce  the product  to identify  the efficient  scale of
production  within a centrally  planned  sewing. After this efficient  scale is identified,  the mirister uses
the cookie cutter to carve a set of identical  factories  at this scale to satisfy industrial  development
needs.
'Mhe  predominant  source  of monopoly  power under central  planning  was the sellers' market
created  by price controls. Price liberalization  then is perhaps  the most important  element  of
competition  policy in Russia  and other countries  of the former  socialist  world.
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Clearly,  the conventional  model  supports  the view that Russian  industry  is very homogeneous.
Each industry  is populated  by identical  firms: .Also, the model  is often interpreted  to suggest  that
industry  is highly  concentrated  and dominated  by very large firms. It is generally  believed  that, by
building  fewer  and, thus, larger enterprises;  the administaive costs  of central  planning  could  be
economized.'  Moreover, Stalinist ministers are generally  believed to have identified scales of
production that were quite large, a phenomenon known as-  gigantomania.'  Eva Ehrlich [1985:  293]
relates  this bias quite  simply,  'In the socialist  countries,  large size and economic  efficiency  were
thought  to be synonymous."  Stalin,  especially,  preferred  large scales  of production  because  such
enterprises  stood out as impressive  examples  of Soviet  industrialization.5
An alternative view of industrial evolution under central planning is implicit  in the more
recent  literature  on ministerial  decision-making  under  central  planning. The older literature
emphasizes  the similarity  of technologies  within  an industry  among  firms  when they are first built;  the
newer  literature  emphasizes  the differences  between  firms  that  become  more  pronounced  as they age.
This newer literature  presents  models  that stress the role of hidden  information  and hidden
action  in the behavior  of decision  makers  under  planning. In these models,  industrial  ministers  must
allocate  production  targets  to enterprises  with imperfect  knowledge  of their true productivity.  To
elicit  information  from enterprises  about  their potential  productivity,  the minister  must  provide
enterprise  directors  with sufficient  incentives  to meet their  targets.
These models  provide  several  insights  into the type of industrial  structure  that evolves  as a
consequence  of this system  of incentives. First, implicit  in the model  is the belief  that enterprises  in
each industry  are heterogeneous.  They differ in productive  potential,  possibly  because  of differences
in managerial  skills  or behavior,  location,  access  to suppliers,  or even  technology. Second,  over
time, these  differences  may  not be fully  revealed. When  the incentives  directors  face  do not
adequately  reward them  for fully revealing  inforrnation,  the directors  of higher  productivity
'Fewer enterprises  makes it easier  to construct  the plan and also reduces  the costs  of monitoring
its implementation.
'See, for example,  Gregory  and Stuart [1986:  143]. We note  that, in early research  on Soviet
enterprises,  gigantomania  referred  to the tendency  of the Soviet  ministers  to built gigantic  plants.
More recently,  however,  this concept  has been  used to describe  enterprise  size.
'Discussing  the fixation  with large enterprises,  Peter Wiles 11962:  3041  writes:  "There is
something  'socialist' and 'progressive'  about  mere size, even if unaccompanied  by lower  costs.
Gigantomania  as such, then, reinforces  the view that large capital  expenditures  are a good thing, even
where  smaller  ones will do."
3ladueria Concgaden
enterprises  will choose  to conceal  the true potential  of their enteririses, precisely  because  they lbow
that ministers  will use this information  against  them in designing  fiture production  targets. This
dynamic  incentives  problem,  the "ratchet  effect,' impairs  economic  performance  because  the treat  of
higher targets causes enterprise  directors  to demand  greater rewards in return for full revelation. This
makes it more costly for planners  to obtain  important  information.'
Ickes and Ryterman  [19931  use these observations  to develop a model  of industrial  evolution
under central  planning. In most of the literature  on managerial  decision  making, the number  of
enterprises  is given. The problem considered  in the Ickes-Ryterman  model  is the determination,  by
the relevant  mi ister, of how many enterprises  should  be built in a given industry. In this model,
planners  provide industrial  ministers  with a stream  of aggregate  output targets  to be met over time.
The industrial  minister, in turn, must disaggregate  these  targets and award them to specific  enterprises
in the ministry,  building  new  enterprises  and expanding  existing  enterprises  to meet this goal. The
minister  cannot, however,  shut down enterprises  that are observed  to be high cost because  the absence
of exit is one of the distinguishing  features of centrally  planned  economies. Of course, the productive
potential  of new enterprises  is learned only over time as the ministers  observe  the ability of enterprise
directors  to consistenty meet production  targets at low cost.
This model  also provides  important  insights  into the evolution  of industry  under central
planning. Again, the model  stresses  the presence  of heterogeneity  within industry.  Over time, as
ministers  observe  the performance  of enterprises,  they naturally  award larger targets  to enterprises
with a demonstrated  ability  to meet their production  goals. Thus, the model  predicts that a mature
industry  will be populated  by a mixture  of enterprises  - larger more productive  enterprises  and
smaller  less productive  ones.  Thus, this and other more recent models  raise the possibility  that
industry, in fact, is not dominated  by very large enterprises  and, consequently,  may not be highly
concentrated.
Ickes and Ryterman  suggest  that the maximum  and minimum  scales  of enterprises  in a
centrally  planned industry  were determined  by an interplay  of technology  and the costs  of centrally
planned  production. All else equal, these administrative  costs increase  with the number  of levels of
hierarchy  as well as well as the span of control  at each level. Therefore,  these costs are viewed  as
favoring  the creation  of fewer larger enterprises  than would  be created  in a market setting.  We
believe  that diseconomies  of scale that are created  in very large enterprises  quickly outweighed  the
administrative  advantages  of very large firms. Larger firms require more layers of hierarchy  to
'Mhe  cassic reference is Berliner  [1957]. Keren [19931  provides  a survey  of this literature.
4monitor  production,  quickldy  adding  to costs. Moreover,  small firms were not required to play the
important  role - in fostering  innovation  - tat  they  play.in market  economies. In market  economies,
small firms enter the market,  experiment  with a new product  or process, then grow or fail based  on
their success. Under central  planning, a different  process of economic  selection  was implemented,
one in which product innovation  was typically  produced  in larger science-production  associations.
Therefore,  we believe  that ministers  economized  on coordination  costs predominantly  by choosing  not
to build very small enterprises.
Industrial  concentration,  in turn, is determined  by the interplay  of technology  and the costs of
centrally  planned production,  on the one hand, and demand,  measured  by the size of output targets,
on the other.  For a given  technology  and costs of coordination,  industrial  concentration  will be
higher in industries  that were presented  with lower aggregate  output targets. This feature  suggests
that, to some extent, important  industries  for which product  demand  was high are less likely  to be
concentrated  than less important  industries. 7 More importantly,  given the large size of the former
Soviet  Union, this feature  suggests  that industrial  concentration  in national  markets is unlikely  to
exist.
1.2  Problems with the Conventional Wisdom
In par-, the conventional  view has been so compelling  historically  because some  empirical
evidence  does appear  to support  it.  In this section, we explain  why we believe  this evidence  is
misleading.
Heidi Kroll, in recent  work [19911,  presents  some  evidence  for bodt large firm sizes and
industrial  concentration  in the Soviet  Union.  Concerning  enterprise  size, she states that, since the
:960's, the size of Soviet enterprises  has been increasing,
The average  number  of employees  per enterprise  rose to 813 in 1987-88,  and 73.4 percent of
the labor force now work in enterprises  employing  more than 1000  workers; indeed,
enterprises  with 10,000  workers  or more employ  21.6 percent  of the labor force, while those
with 500 workers  or fewer  employ  only 14.9 percent of the labor force... 3
7However,  we do recognize  that some  small industries  may have strategic importance  to an
economy.
Kroll [1991: 147].Induarld  Cencrntraion
She gives  many of the conventional  reasons  to expLain  why Soviet  enterprises  were so large.  While
these numbers  seem compelling,  they are haed  if not impossible  to interpret without  comparison  with
other countries.
Eva Ehrlich [1985: 267-295]  does compare  enterprise  and establishment  sizes between
capitalist  and socialist  economies. While her survey  does not include  data from the Soviet  Union, her
methodology  and conclusions  are relevant  to our study. She employs  two measures  to describe
industrial  structure: average  employment  and size distribution  of firms. Her tables show  quite clearly
that average  enterprise  sizes in the socialist  economies,  especially  Poland and Hungary, are greater
than in even the 'large-type' capitalist  economies. The tables also show that size distributions  of
firms vary distinctly  between  the two types  of economies:  the socialist  economies  have a greater
percentage  of employment  in the large firms  and a lower percentage  in the small firms than the
capitalist  countries  do.  Ehrlich relates  the following  metaphor  for socialist  industrial  structure,
A Hungarian  economist  compares  the size structure  of the Hungarian  economic  system to a
pyramid  turned upside  down, characterized  not by large enterprises  relying on a broad  base of
small-  and medium-size  firms  but, on the contrary, by a preponderance  of big enterprises  and
a sirnificant lack of small and medium  ones.2 
Given their understanding  of the distinct  size distributions,  what Ehrlich and Kroll fail to do is
to weight  or correct the averages  they use according  to the different  size distributions  and ihe
different  overall numbers  of firms in these economies. We can illustrate  this problem with a simple
example. Consider  two economies,  each with 10  firms of different  sizes, but distributed  equally
-across  the two economies  so that the average  firm size is the same. Now, give one economy,  A, 10
more firms all of which  are smaller  than the smallest  original  firm, and leave  economy  B the same.
The average  firm size in A is now much smaller,  but that does not mean that  economy  B has more
large firms than A.  In.  other words, this change  does not winvert" B's pyramid,  but rather just builds
to the bottom of A's.  In this paper, we try to draw a clear picture of size structure  both by using
country  comparisons  and by correcting  or explaining  our measures  in terms of size distribution.
Kroll also provides evidence  of industrial  concentration.
According  to Goskomstat  SSSR,  more than  one-third  of the most important  types  of machine-
building  products  are produced  by a single enterprise,  and approximately  the same share is
produced  by only two enterprises..  .According  to Gossnab,  80 percent  of the volume  of output
in machine  building  is manufactured  by monopolists,  and 77 percent of machine-building
'Ehrlich [1985: 294].
6Industdn  Ciucantnadon
enterprises  are monopolists..  .Another statistic  from Gossnab  is that about  2,000 eniterprises  in
the country  are the sole producers  of.a specific  type of product...
The World Bank [1992: 82] provides  even  more startling  statistics. Under the former  regime, the
State Conunittee  for Material  Technical  Supply, Gossnab,  organized  the delivery  of 7,664 distinct
product groups. According  to the World Bank, 77 percent of these products  were produced  by single
enterprises."
These stsics  measure  a specific  type of concentration-product  concentration-that  is, they
measure concentration  in terms of the ability  of the consumer  to find alternative  suppliers  of the exact
same  product. Due to central  planning,  however,  product categories  in the former  Soviet  Union were
defined  very narrowly. In order for the plinners to ensure that  the input  needs  of each producer
would  be met. they (or the appropriate  industrial  minister)  assigned  very specific  targets  for each
intermediate  good. For example,  in principle, the output target for one centimeter  nails would  be
distinct  from the target for two centimeter  nails. As a consequence,  the number  of different  product
categories  used by planners  in the former  Soviet Union  was enormous. Moreover,  enterprises
specialized  in production  more highly than in the West. 12 Under central  planning,  there was no
incentive,  let alone authority,  for the enterprise  to diversify  its production. Thus, while concentration
measured  in terms of products  will naturally  appear  greater than concentration  measured  at a more
aggregated  level, this disaggregation  effect is exaggerated  in the Soviet  case."  In this context,  the
statistics  quoted  above are not all that surprising.
"Kroll [1991:  144-145].
"Kahn and Peck [1991; 62-67]  also discuss  the prevalence  of monopoly  in Soviet industry.
'2Granick  [19671  is the classic  reference  on the forces that went into the design  of enterprises  and
factories  in the Soviet  metal fabricating  industry. One of his important  insights  was the link between
product  specialization  and scale (1967: 361: "If each plant were to limit its output  to a single  product  -
- or to a small range of products  if its output of one item would  exceed the total planned  consumption
of the entire USSR  - and concentrate  all its facilities  on such production,  then each plant could  gain
economies  of scale."
"This point is illustrated,  albeit  unwittingly,  by the IMF-World  Bank-OECD-EBRD  joint study on
the Soviet economy  [1991: 16]: "Industrial  production  in most sectors tends  to be highly  concentrated
in one or a few enterprises. For example, in almost  two-thirds  of the 38 product  groups  included
under sledge-press  machines,  the largest enterprise  accounted  for 75 percent  ore more of total
production  in 1988..." The key point, however, is that with the demise  of central  planning
enterprises  that produce  different  types of sledge-press  machines  can compete  against  each other.
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The other type of concentration  one can measure is tndusty concentration,  that is,
concentration  measured  in terms of the ability of the producer  to supply substitute  or directly
competing  products in the short term.  This measure  is a broader  measure than the one abve,
requiring  enterprises  to be classified  and compared  based on their industry  rather than the specific,
products  they produce. It is based on the assumption  that enterprises  compete  by producing  the same
products, producing  substitute  products, or by being able to easily alter production  in order to make
the same or substitute  products.
In a market seting, where an enterprise's  choice of product  mix is not centrally  determined,
this approach more correcty  measures potential competiftion  between firms that produce similar types
of products.  Potential  competition  is an important  feature of an industrial  structure. In a
decentralized  enviromnent,  the threat of entry, most easily from other firms producing  similar
products, often serves to discipline  existing  firms in a particular  product  market. If existing  firms set
prices too high (or quantities  too low), the incentive  for near competitors  to enter the product  market
and share in oligopoly rents is raised.  Thus,  if a market is contestable, competitive conditions may
exist  even if only one or a few firms produce a product.
The question, then, is which measure is most appropriate  for this analysis. During the Soviet
period, there was no competition  and little opportunity  for enterprise  directors  to choose  their product
mix. Now, with enterprise  reform, decisions  about  product mix are decentralized,  and there is the
potential  for competition. In fact, evidence  from an assortment  of surveys on enterprise  behavior
suggests  that some enterprises,  both state-owned  and privatized, are adapting  their product mix in
order to survive. Thus, we believe  that measures  of industry  concentration  more accurately  reflect
the incentives  related  to competition  in the economy. Furthermore,  from a practical  perspective,
studies of market economies  typically  use industry  measures  rather than product measures  to discuss
concentration  and competition. Not only does this suggest  that industry  measures  are more
appropriate;  it means that by using industry  measures,  we are able to compare  Russia to other
countries.
Kahn and Peck [19911  also find that measures  of product  concentration  exaggerate  the role of
monopoly  and oligopoly  in the Russian economy. They provide  data on the number  of industries  in
Russia  that appear to be concentrated,  and compare  these statistics  to similar ones for the United
States. They find, as we do, that a larger number  of industries  in Russia appear  to be concentrated.
The problem with their analysis,  however, is that it fails to take into account  the importance  of these
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industries."' As we)  demonstrate,  below, this correction  is critical  to understanding  the degree of
industrial  concentr;ition  that actually  exists i  the Russian  economy.
2.  Data and Methodology
We compile  statistics  on industrial  concentration  in the Russian  Federation  using data
collected  for the 1989  Soviet  Census  of Industry. This data set includes  all civilian  enterprises
engaged  in production  activities  defined  by the Soviets  as industrial. For a summary  of the
characteristics  of enterprises  in the data set, see Table 1.
The enterprises  in this data set are classified  based  on the primary conunodity  they produce
and, correspondingly,  are assigned  a U.S. Standard  Industrial  Classification  (SIC) code."  As our
primary concern  is industrial  concentration,  we focus our attention  at the four-digit  SIC level."'
Further disaggregation  would  take us into the realm of product  concentration  which, as we have
argued  above, is of less interest.
Typically, in studies such as ours, sales  are used as the principal  measure of a firm's size.
Unfortunately,  in countries  such as the former Soviet  Union, data measured  in value terms do not
provide  useful measures  of a firm's activity. Aggregate  measuves  of economic  behavior  that are
expressed  in value terms have ambiguous  meaning  because  prices were determiined  by administrative
flat, and not by market interactions. Thus, although  we provide  some statistics  based on sales, we
primarily  use employment to measure  the market  position  of firms within an industry.
Our choice of 1989  was dictated  by circumstance;  that is the year  for which we have the data.
There are, however, some  distinct  advantages  to this year. The survey  methodology  used by
"4Kahn  and Peck [1991: 65] acknowledge  this problem, but did not have the data needed  to
properly weight  industries  according  to their importance  in the economy.
"Unfbrtunately,  we do not know  the industrial  code assigned  to the enterprises  by Goskomstat
(the State Statistical  Office). Consequently,  we cannot aggregate  our data into the standard  branch
divisions  used in Soviet publications,  which are quoted  often in western  analyses. Thus, for example,
we are not able to look at machine  building  as a separate  branch.
"Although many enterprises are assigned codes at the five-digit level, we use four-digit codes in
our analysis. We base our decision  on two factors. First, comparison  at the four-digit  level reveals
evidence  of competition  and potential  competition  within an industry,  while comparison  at the five-
digit lcvel would  reveal information  about product  competition  only. Moreover,  this type of analysis
is nearly always  conducted  at the four-digit  level for the U.S. and other western  countries. Thus,
analysis  at the four-digit  level allows  us to evaluate  industrial  concentration  in the Russian  Federation
in a broader context.
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Goskomstar  (the State Statistical  Office)  was based  on central  planning  institutions.  As those
institutions  began to deteriorate,  the quality  ;f  the survey frame  and data also began to deteriorate.
Analysts  are thus faced with a tradeoff. Earlier years most likely  orovide  more accurate  data, but are
of less interest for their implications  about  the transition. In our assessment,  1989  was the last year
in which Goskomstat  was able to conduct  a survey  at an sufficient  level of quality for this analysis.
Fortnately,  1989  constiutes a good base year to assess  the initial conditions  of reform.
The staistics for the Russian  Federion  are presentea  in context  of statistics  for the U.S. and,
to  a lesser extent, for the O.E.C.D.  We chose  the U.S. as tie dominant  country  for comparison
because  of its size and level of industrial  development. The statistics  on industrial  structure in the
U.S. are based on U.S. Census  Bureau  data 1 , usually  from 1987, although  we do make some
comparisons  which use other years; we specify  when 1987 is not the comparator.
2.1  The Unit of Analysis
Conducting  comparisons  of industrial  structure  between  the Russia  and the United States
raises issues  of the proper unit of comparison. The U.S. Census  Bureau  collects  data at the company
and establishment  levels, where an establishment  is defined as all plants owned  by a company  that are
engaged  in similar activities  at one location. Russian data, however, are collected  at the enterprise
level. Technically,  an enterprise  is a company. However, it differs from a western  company  in an
important  way.
Unlike  companies,  enterprises  are seldom  multi-divisional  firms in the western  sense.
Although  they may produce  several  products  for sale, these products  are typically  in closely  related
product  groups. However,  in addition,  many enterprises  produce  products  that do not reach the
market. Often, enterprises  are vertically  integrated,  producing  output that they consume  as inputs.
Also, many  enterprises  engage  in side activities  such as farming  to provide  food for workers. Thus,
in practice,  Russian  enterprises  might be quite diversified."' Many enterprises  are made up of several
"We  use data from both the Census  of Manufacturers,  Concentration  Ratios in Manufacturing,
1987 and the  1987 Enterprise  Statistics.
"'A good example  is the production  of machinery. According  to Hewett [1988:  172]: 'Some
departments  in nonmachinebuilding  enterprises  also produce  machinery. Forty-five  percent of all
metalworking  equipment  in the Soviet Union  can be found there, a stock  that by itself exceeds in
value the entire capital  stock  of the U.S. machinebuilding  sector."
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plants (zawd),  often in different cities (and, during the Soviet period, even in different republics).
Hence, in certain respects, an enterprise is ldss than a company, but more than an establishment.'
For evaluating firm size and aggregate concentration, we compare Russian enterprises to
U.S. companies, where U.S.  companies are measured by their domesic  employment.  Very large
enterprises in Russia are almost always multi-plant enterprises and, consequiently,  are more like
companies than estdblishments.  Moreover, for the discussion of policy implications related to firm
size and aggregate concentration, company is a more insightful measure.  In contrast, for evaluating
industry concentration, we compare Russian enterprises to U.S.  establishment-groups.  Establishment-
groups are all domestic establishments in a single company that are classified with the same 4-digit
SIC code.?° The U.S. Bureau of the Census uses this unit to partition the company and allocate its
activities to different industries.  This partition enables Census to compute concentration statistics that
reflect the ability of domestic producers to supply substitute or direcdy competing products in the
short term.  To the extent that Russian enterprises are like establishments (in that their priniary
products for sale are closely related), this comparison is direct.  To the extent that Russian enterprises
are, in fact, diversified companies, concentration measures will overstate the level of concentration in
the Russian economy.  Consequently, using the enterprise data actually biases the Russian statistics
against our case.
The use of enterprise data does raise an important issue, however.  Beginning with a decree
of Brezhnev in 1973, Soviet enterprises were organized into associations (obyedineniya).2  The
enterprises that comprise an obyedineniye were operated under a single management22 Hence, when
1 "he  extreme vertical integration of enterprises presents an important additional source of
potential competition in the Russian economy.  In our analysis, we measure concentration based on
the industry to which the enterprise belongs.  To the extent that the enterpr.se produces products that
belong to a different SIC code, we are understaing the potential for competition.
2Ihese  statistics are based on establishment level data which are then aggregated into the
establishment-group unit of measure.  The concenation  ratios that we present at the two-dgit  level
are based on company data with company as the unit of measure.  The bias is not great here since
few companies will have establishments in two different two-digit industries.
2'The  primary purpose of the reform was to reduce the administrative burdens on the planners, as
discussed above.
'According  to Conyngham [1982: 228] the average number  Of  enterprises in an obyedinemiye
varied across sectors: "in the machine-building industries, the ptoduction unions average five or six
enterprises.  In light industry, the average is nine... in the chemical, coal, and other extractive
industries, however, (associations) usually incorporate twenty-five or more enterprises."
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we examine  enterprise  data, we may be treating units that belong  to a single, larger structure  as if
they were independent  units.  It is important  to keep in mind, however, that our purpose  in this paper
is to examine  industrial  strmcture&in  Russia as it pertains  to the development  of a market economy. In
this context, enterprises  seem to be the appropriate  unit of analysis,  because these are the units that
are typically  being privatized.
2.2  The Military Industrial Complex (MIC)
The primary difference  between  the Russian and the U.S. data sets is the fact that the Russian
data set includes  data on the civilian  sector only.  The military-industrial  complex  (MIC) in Russia is
very important  Consequently,  we cannot  simply ignore its presence  in our analysis. To deal with
this problem, we have assumed  that the industrial  structure  of the MIC closely  resembles  that of
heavy industry  in the civilian  sector. We then use the observed distributions  of heavy industry  in the
civilian  sector to produce esimates of the industrial  structure  of the MIC.  We base our choice on the
observation  that the process of industrial  evolution  in the MIC closely  resembled  the process of
evolution  of heavy industry  in the civilian  sector. In fact, our calculations  suggests  that the mean size
of firms in the military-industrial  sector is smaller  than the mean size of firms in civilian  heavy
industry?.  In our analysis, we estimate the total number of firms in the military-industrial complex?'
and assume  the distribution  of these firms by size resembles  the distribution  in civilian  heavy
industry.  Although  this process  produces  an upward  bias in the distribution  of firms in the military-
industrial  complex  (toward  larger firns than is statistically  evident),  we feel this more conservative
approach is necessary to persuade readers to our point of view.
Specifically,  to estimate  the size distribution  of enterprises  in the military-industrial  complex,
we computed the size distribution of enterprises in the following civilian branches: chemicals,.
industrial  machinery  and equipment,  electronics,  transport  equipment,  and instruments. We selected
these branches  based on our belief that enterprises  in the military-industrial  complex  produce similar
2 'The average firm size for our proxy group of branches  (chemicals,  industrial  machinery  and
equipment,  electronics,  transport equipment,  and instruments)  is 1,750. We know that adding  the
MIC to our data would  add 5,309 enterprises  and 7,979,161  workers.  This implies  an average  firm
size of 1,503 for the MIC.  The largest enterprise  in Russia, for example, is Autovaz, a civilian, not
a military  enterprise.
'Including fuels and energy  production.
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types of products.2? Then, we applied this distribution to the number of enterprises that are kmown  to
exist in the miliary-ipdistrial  sector.'  See Table 2 for more detailed information.
Although this method is useful in correcting biases inrroduced in estimates of enterprise size,
we do not use it in calculations of industry concentration.  While omission of enterprises that are part
of the military-industrial complex may bias statistics related to firm size downward (for example, the
average size of the 100 largest firms), it is unlikely to do so in the case of measures of industrial
concentration.  Enterprises in the military-industrial complex are of two types.  Some produce
products that compete with those produced by enterprises in the civilian sector.  In these cases, our
(unadjusted) statistics overstate the level of concentration in Russia, a bias that only strengthens the
force of our conclusions  Alternatively, some enterprises in the military-industrial complex produce
products that are not produced in the civilian sector.  In these cases, we suggest the reader look to
levels of concentration that are measured in heavy civilian industry for a prediction of the levels of
concentration in these industries.
3.  Myths  and  Reality
In this section, we discuss some of the most commonly held myths concerning firm size and
concentration in the Russian economy.  We begin with a discussion of the size distribution of
enterprises.  We then turn to industrial concentration at the national level, and finally to concentration
at the industry level.
3.1  Size Distribution  of Enterprises
The conventional view of industrial evolution in Russia emphasizes the dominant role played
by very large firms in the economy.  As a result, it views Russian industry as highly concentrated.  In
2 'We  did not adjust the implicit weights assigned to any of the civilian branches in the
computation of the size distribution.  We base this decision on the observation that the military-
industrial complex may have beer. fairly autarkic; as a consequence, its structure should reflect an
industrial balance not unlike that observed in the remainder of the economy.
'We  note that the mean size of enterprises in heavy civilian industry is larger than the mean size
of enterprises in the military-industrial complex.  As a consequence, when we use the size distribution
of firms in heavy civilian industry to approximate the size distribution of the military-industrial
complex, we unavoidably inflate the number of workers employed in this sector.  Specifically; official
data suggests that 7,979,161 workers are employed in the military-industrial complex; however, when
we use the distribution of employment in heavy civilian industry to estimate the size of firms in the
military-industrial complex, we estimate that 9,289,726 workers are employed in the sector.
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contrast,  the more recent  work on industrial  evolution  suggests  that Russian  industry  is fairly
heterogeneous  in terms of size, opening  the possibility  that industry  is not dominated  by very large
firms and, in fact, may  not be highly concentrated.  Clearly,  then, the size distribution  of enterprises
is at the very heart of our discussion  of industrial  concentration  in Russia. Thus, we begin  by
presenting  evidence  related  to the size distribution  of firms.
Myth 1:  Many Russian  enterprises  are very large. The Russian  economy  suffers
from gigantomania.
Reality  1:  In fact, Russia's largest  enterprises  are actually  smaller  than the largest
finns in many O.E.C.D. countries.
In Table  3, we compare  the size of the largest  finrs in O.E.C.D countries  with that of
Russia. The ten largest  civflian  firms in Russia  employed  an average  of 62,649  workers. We
estimate  that the ten largest  firms, including  those  in the military-industrial  complex,  employed  an
average  of approximatly 92,698 workers  (table  8).27  We can compare  these average-employment
statistics  to those  for the top ten firms in a sample  of other countries  using 1985  statistics  found in
Scherer  and Ross [1990: 63j.  Table 3 shows  that these statistics  for Russia  are notably  smaller  than.
those for the United  States,  Japan, West Germany,  the United  Kingdom,  and France, and, on
average,  about  the same as that for Holland. The result is similar  when one compares  the average
firm sizes of the top 20 firms  in these countries;  that is, the average-employment  of the top 20
Russian  enterprises  is notably  smaller. In fact, there are only 113  civilian  and approximately  217
total industrial  enterprises  in Russia  that have 10,000  workers or more.
These findings  are actually  not that surprising. Most of the very large companies  in the
O.E.C.D. countries  are multinational  enterprises  that have  both multinational  labor markets  - they
2 t To estimate  the number  of enterprises  in the military-industrial  complex  that employ 10,000
workers  or more, we calculated  the percent  of civilian  enterprises  in heavy industry  that employed
10,000 to 19,999 workers, 20,000 to 29,000 workers, ... ,  90,000 to 100,000 workers, and more than
100,000  workers and applied  these percents  to the number  of enterprises  in the military-industrial
complex. To estimate  the size of the enterprises  in the military-industrial  complex,  we calculated  the
mean size of civilian  enterprises  in each size class and assigned  the mean to all the non-civilian
enterprises  widiin  the class. We note hiat,  due to the small number  of firms involved  in the
calculation  of the ten largest  finns in the economy  (cited  above),  the particular  estimate  is subject  to
large potential  error.
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employ  people at home and abroad  - as well as multinational  product  markets  for their goods. They
tend to operate in environments  in which  communication  and other infrastructure  facilitating  large-
scale organization  is good. Thus, their large size can represent  an efficient  scale of production.
Large Russian enterprises,  on the other hand, cannot  be considered  conventional  multi-national  firms.
While they were often built to serve the C.M.E.A. market,  they rarely located  production  outside
national  boundaries. But, there is no reason to conclude  a priori that their sizes are too large for
their national and regional  markets.
The conventional  belief, or myth, that Russian  firms are unnaturally  large is often used to
suggest  that they must, in fact, be inefficiently  large. This conclusion  then supports  the position  of
those  who favor breaking  up Russian enterprises  during  transition. Our evidence  shows,  however,
that it is incorrect to assume  that Russian  enterprises  are inefficient  based on size alone. If Russian
enterprises  are inefficient,  their inefficiency  likely comes from internal  organization  rather than from
scale of production. The inernal organization  of many  Russian firms  reflects historic circumstances,
rather than market conditions. The assertion  that Russian  enterprises  are "too large' is really an
assertion  about  the shape  of the cost functions  of these  units.  Without  such data one cannot  really
address  the issue. But the comparison  with other O.E.C.D. countres does provide  some  perspective
on the size of Russian  enterprises.  Organizational  inefficiencies  can be found in firms of all sizes and
require a much  different  set of remedies  tan  simply  breaking  up large firms into their constituent
plants.
Myth 2:  The size distribution  of Russian enterprises  can be represented  by an
inverted  pyramid. There are many large enterprises  and very few medium  or small
enterprises.
Reality 2:  The size distnrbution  is better represented  by an uprightpyramid. The
significant  difference  between  the industrial  structure  of market economies  and that of
Russia is that Russia  lacks the myriad  of very small firms found in market  economies.
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Tables  4, 5, and 6 show the distributions  of Russian and U.S. manufacturing  enterprise?s  by
enterprise  employment.' In
table 4, we see that, while  Russia  does have more large finns and the U.S. has dramatically  more
small firms, for both countries  the number  of firms as a percentage  of total firms in a size class
decreases  as the size of firms in the class increases. Thus, the image  created  by the industrial
structure in both Russia and the U.S. is an upright  pyramid, in which  many smaller finns support
fewer larger firms.  In table 5, we see that  an inverted  pyramid is present in the Russian  case, but it
describes  the distribution  of small firms only. That is, the number  of firms as a percentage  of total
small firms in a size class increases  with the size of firms in the class in the case of Russia, but
decreases  in the case of the U.S.  We consider  this observation  very important. It supports  the
conclusion  from the historical  evidence  that there was, in effect, a lower bound on enterprise size in
the former Soviet Union.
The relative absence  of small enterprises  in Russian  industry  suggests  that comparing  Russia
and the United  States  by looking  at average  firms size for industry  as a whole may be misleading  If
-we  take the arithmetic  mean,  for example,  we find that manufacturing  firms in Russia employ an
average  of 670 workers in the.civilian  sector and an estimated  average  of 925 workers  when firms in
the military-industrial  complex  also are considered.  In contrast,  manufacturng firms in the U.S.
enploy an average  of 70 workers.  We can correct for the small-frm bias by computing  average
emnployment  per firm for all manufacturing  firms employing  above a lower bound  of 249 employees.
In Russia, these firms employ  an average  of 1,297 workers in the civilian  sector and an estimated
average  of 1,621 workers  in both sectors, while, in the U.S., these manufacturing  firms employ
2Manufacturing  enterprises  are a subset  of industrial  enterprises. See table-l for a breakdown  of
all industrial  enterprises  in the Census  into one-digit  SIC codes.
2-We  base the size categories  on the current Russian definitions,  with one exception. In tables 4
through  6, we define  small enterprises  based  on the U.S. definition  of 1 to 249 workers..
(Consequently,  medium  firms begin with 250 workers.) The 'very small' categories  are based on the
categories  in U-S. tables. In further tables which  just present  Russian  data, small is 1 to 199
employees.
To-  estimate  the number  of non-civilian  firms in each size class, we calculated  the share of
enterprises  in heavy civilian  industry  in each size class and applied  these shares to the total number  of
firms in the military-industrial  complex. Similarly,  we used mean employment  by enterprises  in
heavy civilian  industry  in each size class as the approximate  employment  of non-civilian  firms
assigned  to the class.
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2,103 workers.30  Average employment  by manufacturing  firms with 50 workers  or more is 761
workers  in the civilian  sector in Russia, an estimated  1,025 workers in both sectors, and 498 workers
in the U.S?1
The distribution  of employment  (rather  than firms) across size categories  presents a more
striking  difference  between  the two countries  (the lower panel of table 4).  In Russia 91.5 percent of
civilian employment  and an estimated  94.5 percent of total employment  in manufacturing  is provided
by enterprises  with employment  of 250 or greater, while only 73.1 percent of U.S. manufacturing
employment  is provided  by similar firms. But, these statistics  obscure  the dominant  role of extra-
large firms in the provision  of employment  in the U.S.  A closer examination  of the size distribution
of firms in the two countries  reveals  this role. Three-fourths  of Russian manufacturing  employment
falls in the middle of the distribution,  that is, in medium  and large enterprises. In contrast,  two-thirds
of U.S. manufacturng employment  falls in the tails, in sinall and extra-large  firms.  Strikingly, 40.2
percent of the U.S. employment  is provided  by extra-large  firms, while only 15.3 percent of Russian
civilian employment  and an estimated  20.5 percent of total manufacturing  employment  are provided
by similar  firms.  Thus, in comparison  with the U.S., the Russian economy  is not dominated  by
gigantic  firms and Russian employment  is not dominated  by employment  in very large firms.
The importance  of medium  and large enterprises  in Russian  industry  is also evident in table
7, where we break down  the size distribution  of firms  for separate  branches  of civilian  industry in
Russia.32  This table also snows  that production  by very large firms is mostly  concentrated  in a few
industrial  branches. Just four branches contain 84 of the 113 extra-large  enterprises  in the civilian
sector, and one of these, mining, is a non-manufacturing  branch. The other three are industrial
machinery  and equipment,  primary metals, and transportation  equipment. These branches not only
have a large share of their employment  in extra-large  enterprises  - an average  of 45 percent - they
also represent  a large share of industrial  employment  - an average  of 8.7 percent each.  The results
from table 7 suggest  that, for some  branches,  restructuring,  especially  reorganization  of the large
enterprises,  will have a significant  effect  on their relevant  labor markets.  But"  this is clearly  not true
'Mhe total numbers  of firms  used for these calculations  are 8,131 for civilian  manufacturing  in
Russia, 12,131 for total manufacturing,  and 7,454 for the U.S.
'"The total numbers  of firms used for these calculations  are 15,066  for civilian  and 20,233 for
total manufacturing  in Russia, and 37,604 for manufacturing  in the U.S.
2The  branch distinctions  for the manufacturing  enterprises  are 2-digit  SIC categories. The other
branches  are 1-digit  groups, except for construction  and mining which  have been divided into two.
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for all branches of industry, nor even for branches with large shares of industrial employment.  The
other branches with high shares of national ihdustrial employment - Food and Kindred Products,
Lumber and Wood Products, Stone, Clay, and Glass, and Textile Mill Products - have zero to little
employment in extra-large firms.  Thus, while restructuring in the industries in these branches will
significantly impact the economy, the issues involved will be somewhat different.
3.2  Industrial  Concentration
There are several measures of industrial concentration that are commonly utilized.  Ownership
concentration measures how diffuse is the ownership of industry.  Russian industry in 1989 was
entirely state-owned, leaving little to study?'  Product concentration measures the degree to which
products are produced by few or many enterprises.  This measure, however, says very little about
potential competition, because it disaggregates markets too finely, especially given the very distinct
product categories used in Soviet planning.  Moreover, given the fact that central planners
deternined  the assortment plans of enterprises, product concentration says very little about what
enterprises can produce.  Rather,  it is more a measure of the assortment planners and ministers chose.
Consequently, we focus our attention on measures of concentration both in the aggregate and
by industrial branch.  The former essentially measures how large enterprises are relative to the size of
the economy.  The latter is a measure of market power.  We consider these in turn.
3.2.1  Aggregate  Concentration
Perhaps the most salient component of the conventional wisdom is the belief that the Russian
economy is dominated by large enterprises.
Myth  3:  The largest Russian enterprises account for an unusually large share of
national production and employnrent.
Reality 3:  The largest enterprises account for only a moderate share of national
production and employment.
3The  Russian privatization plan, since it gives advantages to insiders, wil  most likely lead to a
rather diffuse ownership at least in the first stages.  It will be interesting to study what happens to
ownership concentration in the faure.
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Table 8 presents  statistics  describing  the role,  of the largest  enterprises  in industrial
employment  and production. The ten largest enterprises  by employment  account  for 4.6 percent of
national  civilian employment;  the top 100, 16.3 percent.  Our estimates  suggest, that if enterprises
in the military-industrial  complex  were included  in our sample, the top 100  enterprises  in the entire
economy  would  account  for a smaller share, approximately  14.3  percent of total employment.
Scherer and Ross present  aggregate  concentration  shares for the United States  for 1982r; table 9 is a
supplemented  version of their table. They show  that, in the U.S., the largest 100 manufacturing
corporations  accounted  for 23.8 percent of total U.S. employment. In Russia,  sales of the largest 100
civilian  firms accounted  for 21.6 percent  of total sales, while sales of the largest 100.firms  in the
U.S. accounted  for 31.8 percent of total sales of civilian  goods. The comparisons  for the largest  200
firms offer the same conclusions.
Table 10 compares  aggregate  concentration  in the U.S. and Russia at higher level&.  In spite
of the fact that Russia has 1118  the number  of manufacturing  'irms as the U.S., the manufacturing
four-firn concentration  ratio for Russia is three percentage  points lower than for the U.S., and this
margin  persists in the other groupings  as well. Thus, aggregate  concentration  in Russia  is less than in
the market economy  of the U.S.  These results  relate to those  above which show  that enterprises  are
not as gigantic  as we once  presumed.
Table 8 also shows  how aggregate  civilian  coricentration  is distributed  across  industries  and
regions. The top 10 civilian  firms only represent  four branches;  in fact, these firms represent  only
four industries  at the 4-digit  S.I.C. level. This concentration  of Russia's major enterprises  in a few
number  of branches and industries  is also true when examining  the top 25, 50, or 100  civilian
enterprises. These major enterprises  seem to be rather broadly  distributed  across oblasts (provinces),
however. Seven  different  oblasts  have enterprises  in the top 10, and these  fall in six different
economic  regions. Thirty-nine  out of the 78 oblasts in Russia contain  enterprises  with 10,000
workers  or more, and these  fall in all 12 of the economic  regions. Thus, the major enterprises  are
not geographically  concentrated. Only one oblast, Kemerovskaya,  stands  out as having a large share
'Scherer and Ross [1990:  591. Scherer  and Ross explain  that aggregate  concentration  in the
U.S., in terms of domestic  manufacturing  activities  alone,  has risen insignificantly  since  the 1960's.
Thus, the use of 1982  data for the U.S. in comparison  with 1989  data for Russia  does not present a
significant  problem.
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of the major civilian enterprises.  It has six of the top 25 civilian firms and seven of the top 50
civilian firms.
3.3  Industry  Concentration
Prior to presenting our evidence, we should say a few words about measuring, comparing,and
thinking about industry concentration  Any comparison of concentration between the U.S.  and Russia
is tricky because the U.S. has both many more industries and many more firms than Russia.  In
manufacturing alone, the U.S. has 448 industries at tde 4-digit S.I.C. level, while Russia has only
350 4-digit industries.6 Even when using percentages of concentrated industries versus actual
numbers, the comparison could be biased by the type of industries that Russia does not have.  The
U.S.  also has almost 18 times as many firms.  In terms of firms per industry, the U.S.  has an average
of 685.5 firms per industry in manufacturing, while Russia's average is only 49.1.  In these simple
terms, Russia's production is clearly more concentrated.  This does not mean, however, that Russia's
industrial markets are necessarily non-competitive.
We employ three measures of industry concentration.  The most well known is the four-firm
concentration ratio (CR4).  This is a ratio of the sum of the measure for the largest four firms
(according to the same measure) to the sum of the measure over all firms in the industry.  More
specifically, we usually calculate the sum of employment in the four firms with the most employment
in the industry as a percent of the sum of employment in all the firms in the industry.  We calculate
CRB's in the same manner for the largest eight firms in an industry?'
We also classify enterprises according to how many enterprises there are in that industry, that
is, we identify monopolists, duopolists, oligopolists, and others which fall into larger categories.
Finally, we use the Russian measure of a 'domidant'  firm; a dominant firm is one which accounts for
a 35 percent or greater share of its industry's market in terms of employment or sales.  In the tables
35Kemerovskaya  oblst  is located on the east border of Western Siberia in the south.
MThis  number for the U.S.  does include military production and thus likely includes industries
which are not counted in the Russian number.
"Without  information about costs we cannot calculate Lerner Indices.  We calculate concentration
ratios rather than Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices (HHI's).  As Scherer and Ross explain, CR4's and
HHI's  are highly correlated (Scherer and Ross 11990: 74]), and the analysis we do is not precise
enough to warrant the more complicated statistic.
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looking  at Russia  alone; and  unless otherwise  specified,  all measures  are calculated  at the four-digit
industry  level.  That means we report the highest  possible  measure  of industry  concentration.
We therefore implicitly  define the relev;ant  market for competition  as the four-digit  industry
level. This assumption  is no more than a guess  or a proxy.  For some  industries,  the relevant
markets  are more distinct,  for some more aggregated.? As we explain  earlier in the paper, we
intentionally  measure industry  concentration  instead  of product  concentration. The four-digit  level is
then the most disaggregated  market we can choose. In the case where the relevant  markets  are larger,
we actually  overstate  concentration. We try to con;rol  for this problem in the U.S.-Russia
comparisons  by calculating  the statistics  at the same  level in each country.
Myth 4:  Russian  industry  is highly  monopolized. These monopolies  are very large
enterprises.
Reaity  4  When measured  at the national  level, there are very few monopolistic
enterprises  in Russia, and most of these firms are relatively  small.
Table 11 shows  that only 43 of the 21,391 civilian  Russian enterprises  are monopolies  in their
four-digit  industries  at the national  level. While  this represents  10.6 percent of all industries,  it only
represents  0.2 percent of civilian  firms, 0.2 percent of civilian  employment,  and 0.2 percent of
civilian  output  This measure  of industy concentration  and, thus, potential  competition  is much
lower than the statistics  often  quoted, for example  the ones from Koll  [19911  above, which is that
around 80 percent of Russian  products are produced  by monopolies. Table 11 also shows  that, while
the mean size of a monopoly  is 726 workers,  the median  is only 285 workers. Even 726  workers is
less than the means in all other competition  classes,  except  the class with the most number of finms.
Looking  at table 12, we see that there are no extra-large  firms  that are monopolies,  or duopolies  for
that matter. In fact, 32 of the 43 monopolies  have less than 1,000 employees.
If we define  oligopoly  quite liberally  to mean four or fewer firms in an industry, we see in
table 11 that, while 26.4 percent of industries  in this sample  are oligopolies,  they only account  for 1.1
percent of all these firms and 1.9 percent  of all this employment. At the same time, 70.3 percent of
firms and 41.8 percent of employment  falls in enterprises  in industries  which  have more than 100
'Scherer and Ross [1990:  73] offer a good  discussion  of defining  markets according  to SIC
codes.
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firms.  The highest  employment  mean is in the industry  category  with five to ten firms, and table 12
shows that the plurality  (and one-third  of allj extra-large  firms are in industries  with 21 to 50 firms.
Mammoth  monopolies  simply  do not dominate  the civilian  industrial  sector.
Myth 5:  Russian industry  is heavily concentrated.
Reality 5.1:  Measured  at the two-digit  level, U.S. manufacturing  is at least as
concentrated  as Russian  manufacturing.
Table 13 lists CR4's and CR8's by employment  for companies  in two-digit  manufacturing
branches in the U.S. and Russia."  If one took the argument  seriously  that the industrial  structure  of
Russia was arbitrary, then one would expect  there to be no correlation  between  the concentr.tion
ratios in Russia and the United  States. In fact, however, the Pearson correlations  between  the U.S.
and Russia  for the two sets are .72 and .82 respectively. These results suggest  that, in terms of the
larger firms in these branches,  the U.S. and Russian  industrial  structures  are actually  quite similar - a
surprising  result if one believes  that the Russian industrial  structure  should appear  artificial  or
unnatural as a consequence  of central  planning. Further, the mean CR4 and CR8 for the U.S. are
both greater than those for Russia; the hypothesis  that they are equal is rejected with 97 percent
confidence  or better.  Table 14 presents  similar information,  but with the CR4's and CR8's calculated
by sales rather than employment. Here again, the Pearson  statistic  shows positive  correlation with
values of .67 and .77.  While  the mean ratios for the U.S. are greater than those for Russia, in this
case one cannot  reject the null that they are equal. This is still a surprising  result when one expects
Russian manufacturing  to be much more concentrated.
These tables present  another interesting  comparison  - that between  the CR's calculated  in
terms of employment  and those calculated  in terms of sales within the two countries. In all four
comparisons,  U.S. and Russia  for four-firm  and eight-firm, the concentration  ratios calculated  in
terms of sales are higher than those  for employment. But, this difference  is much greater for Russia
than for the U.S.  The null hypothesis  that the U.S. four-firm  concentration  ratios for employment
'Comparisons of the U.S. and Russia are potentially  biased in favor of the result that the U.S. is
less concentrated. The reason is that the U.S. Census  Bureau  does not publish concentration  ratios
when those numbers  might reveal information  about specific  enterprises  in an industry. These
missing  data then are concentration  ratios that are quite high; six such observations  are deleted  from
this analysis. This bias causes  the analysis  to understate  concentration  in the U.S.
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and sales have equal means cannot  be rejected,  but the null for the other three sets can be rejected,
and for the Russian numbers, the confidence  level is greater than 99 percent. The mean concentration
ratios calculated  by sales in the Russian  series are at least six percentage  points higher than those
calculated  in terms of employment,  while for the U.S. the difference  is only 1.8 points. This finding
implies  that, relative  to the U.S., the large firms in Russian manufacturing  represent a larger
percentage  of output than they do of labor.  This conclusion  continues  to hold if we look at industry
as a whole.  Extra-large  enterprises  in civilian  manufacturing  account  for 25.6 percent of
manufacturing  output and only 15.3 percent of manufacturing  labor; extra-large  enterprises in all of
civilian  industry  account  for 22.9 percent of industrial  output and just 17.3 percent of industrial  labor.
The small and .nedium-sized  firms, on the other hand, account  for a greater percentage  of labor than
of output.
Reality 5.2:  Measured  at the four-digit  level, the industrial  structures  of the U.S. and
Russian  manufacturing  sectors are quite different, and the Russian sector appears more
concentrated.
Comparing  CR4's across 331 observations  of matching  U.S. and Russian  four-digit  industries,
we find that the Pearson Correlation  is only .06.  The mean CR4 for Russian  manufacturing  is 69
while the mean for the U.S. is 36, and, not surprisingly,  the null that the means are equal is rejected
with 100  percent probability. It is interesting  that the structures  of two economies  seem to diverge so
much when viewed at a lower level of aggregation. Upon examination  of the data, we discover that,
in striking  contrast to the U.S.  industrial  structure, many industries  in Russia, are in fact, very small.
Thus, a more meaningful  way to compute  the Pearson correlations  is to weight  the comparisons  of
industrial  concentration  by industry  size.
One simple way of weighting  is to compare  only the predominant  industries  in Russia with the
same industries  in the United  States. Comparing  the ratios for the top 25 percent of industries  in
Russia in terms of employment,  we find that the means  are not significantly  different;  both are about
40.  As we take larger groupings  of the major industries,  the mean CR4 for Russia increases  while
that for the U.S. remains about  the same.  Even  for the top 75 percent of industries  though, the
Russian mean is still under 60, that is, on average, concentration  is not high enough  to be considered
a barrier.
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'Reality  5.3:  At the four-digit  industry  level, many  more  Russian  industries  are
concentrated  than U.S. industries;  however  these industries  account  for a minority
share  of Russian  industrial  activity.
When  one thinks  about  the above  analysis,  it may  not seem  significant  that  the concentration
levels  are roughly  similar  between  the U.S. and Russia  for only  the top 25 percent  of industries  in
Russia. Further  analysis  reveals,  however,  that the top 25 percent  of industries  accounts  for almost  .,
80 percent  of employment  in the 331-industry  sample. The top  75 percent,  whose  mean CR4 is less
than  60, accounts  for over 99 percent  of the employment.
Table 15 presents  more statistics  on industrial  concentration  in Russia  using the full sample  of
Russian  industries  and grouping  industries  by concentration  ratios  instead  of ordering  by employment
From this  table, we see that 55.2 percent  of four-digit  industries  in all Russian  industry  have fc  z'r-
firm concentration  ratios  of employment  of 61 percent  or more;  62.1 percent  have  four-firm  ratios  of
sales of 61 percent  or more. This 55.2 percent  of industries  in the top half of the table represents
only 17.5  percent  of industrial  employment  and 17.4  percent of industrial  sales. To provide  a context
for these  statistics,  we compare  them  to those  for the U.S.  Table 16 offers  a comparison  of U.S. and
Russian  four-digit  industry  concentration  in manufacturing  using  categories  of four-firm  concentration
ratios.'  Here we see that, in the U.S., only 17.6  percent  of industries  have  CR4's of 60 percent  or
greater, while  in Russia,  64.8 percent  do. There is little doubt  that more  Russian  manufacturing
industries  are concentrated.  However,  the 17.6  percent  of industries  in the U.S. account  for 19.8
percent  otvalue added, while  the 64.8 percent  in.Russia  account  for only  30.9 percent  of sales and
25.0 percent  of employment.  In other  words, the percentage  of industries  in the U.S. that are
concentrated  is much  more indicative  of shares  of economic  activity  than in Russia. Thus, the
statistics  describing  the number  of concentrated  industriec  are misleading  whtn assessing  the
importance  of concentration  to the economy.
Rea5Lty  5A: Concentrated  industries  in Russia  have a different  industrial  structure
than  industry  in general.
'We use calculations  from Scherer  and  Ross [1990: 83J  which  are based  on 1982  establishment
data  and use establishment  groups  as the unit of measure.
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Concentrated  industries  in Russia  have  proportionately  more  medium,  large, and extra-large
enterprises  and fewer  small  ones  than in industry  in general. This demonstrates  that  the problem  of
*  very few  smalf  firms  is even  more important  in concentrated  industries. Concentrated  industries
(defined,  for example,  as industries  with CR4's of over 40 percent)  are thus different  from other
industries,  not only in terms  of the industries'  top  enterprises,  but also in the overall  distribution  of
enterprises  within  the industries.  This is evident  from the data  in the bottom  half of table 12. In
addition,  note from table 16 that  concentrated  industries  account  for a larger share  of output  than
employment,  while  in other industries  just the opposite  is tue.  This seems  to suggest  that enterprises
in highly  concentrated  industries  have  higher  labor  productivity  than in industry  in general. One  must
be careful  about  such inferences,  however,  since  they are based  on data  generated  under  the system  of
regulated  prices and planned  outputs.
Reality 5.5:  In the set of industries  that  are highly  concentrated,  concentration  is
mostly  due to having  few  firms in the industry  rather than  to having  principal  firms  in
the industry.
When industries  are arranged  by CR4's, into deciles  for example,  one might  expect  that  the
share  of total industries  in a decile  would  be roughly  similar  to the share  of total  value added  or
nationa employment  in that decile. This is in fact the case  for the US.  For Russia,  on the other
hand, while  the top decile  represents  the lowest  share  of output and  employment,  it accounts  for more
four-digit  industries  than  the  other three combined.on  the top four deciles  of industries  by
concentration  ratios  (table  15). Table 16 shows  a similar  distribution  - almost  half of all industries
fall in t.e top category  of the CR4 ranges. If we arranged  the data in table 16 from quintiles  into
deciles  of concentration  ratios, we would  find that  most of the 45 percent  would  indeed  fall in the 90
to 100  category,  but account  for a small  share  of employment  and sales. The very high CR4's
suggest  one of two  things:  either  production  in these  industries  is highly concentrated  in the largest
firms,  or these industries  have  very few firms. Table 17 shows  that the latter  is true.  One  hundred
seven  of the 125  industries  in the 91 to 100  percent  decile  have  four or fewer  firms, and none of
these industries  has more  than 10 firms. There is, in fact, a triangle  of zeros  in the lower  left portion
of the table  - concentrated  industries  have few  firms. No industry  with an employment  CR4  greater
than  60 percent  has more  than  50 firms.
It may seem  obvious  that this latter  explanation  is true.  But, limited  evidence  on the U.S.
suggests  that the opposite  is true,  Xt  is, that  high CR4's in the U.S. indicate  a high concentration  of
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production  in the larger firms, but do not necessarily  indicate  a very small  number  of firms. Table
18 presents  comparisons  of sales CR4's and'CRB's  for selected  four-digit  industries  in the U.S. and
Russia. 4'  In this selected  sample  alone,  there are two four-digit  industries  in the top decile  wit  far
more  than  ten firms - one has 352  firms. Of the 16 industries  with CR4's of 60 percent  or greater,
there are nine with more  than  50 firms. Thus, based  on this sample  evidence  alone,  we know  that  a
table 17  for the U.S. would  not have  zeros in the lower  left triangle. In all of the 350 industries,  of
the 53 U.S. industries  with  CR4's of 60 or greater,  there are 19 industries  with more than  50 firms,
and  of the 10 in the top decile  (including  those  with  undisclosed  ratios),  six of them  have  more than
10  firms-the average  is 121  firms.
The Russian  evidence  points  to three  explanations.  The first is that the industries  in our data
set with few firms have  parallel  four-digit  industries  in the defense  sector. We know  that  many
civilian  goods were produced  by enterprises  in the military-industrial  complex  and, thus, are not
represented  in our data.' 2 Where  this is the case  then, the industries  actually  have  many  more firms
and are likely less concentrated  than  our data  show. If we had these  finms  in our data, then, not only
would  we find fewer concentrated  industries,  but we would  also  see that  the match  up between
industries and shares of both employment  and output is more even.  In other words, it is not that
these industries  have  such  a small  share  of employment  and output  relative  to th- others  in our data,
but rather we just do not  see how  much  they actually  account  for.  Looking  at uble 18, we guess  that
the exclusion  of finns in the military-industrial  complex  probably  explains  the high concentration  and
low  firm numbers  for household  television  receivers,  semiconductors,  and even  possibly  screw
machine  products. However,  it probably  does not explain  the concentration  in the women's  and
misses' dresses  industry.
'As it is not feasible  to include  a table with all 350 manufacturing  industries,  we present  a
selected  sample  in 18. To create  a "random"  sample  for comparing  the U.S. and Russia,  we adopt
the selected  industries  which  Scherer  and Ross [1990:  77J, with no intention  of comparing  to Russia,
present  in their  text.  The U.S. numbers  in our table are updated  to 1987,  however,  and  a we change
a few of the industries  up or down  a category  in order  to exactly  match  as many  industries  as
possible. We also  reordered  the listing  so that the 1987  CR4's for the U.S. industries  are in
descending  order.
'2Another  reason  why  some  firms  may be missing  is that some  of these products  are consumed  by
the enterprises  that produce  them. Therefore,  these  products  never  reach  the market. This
explanation  is especially  important  for critical  inputs  whose  delivery  was very uncertain  under central
planning. To eliminate  the uncertainty,  enterprises  often.  developed  the internal  capacity  to produce
their inputs  ("universalism").
26The second  explanation  is that some  industries  there were some  industries  which,  Soviet
planners  intentionally  kept smnal. These  industries  were probably  low priority  sectors  - light industry
and consumer  goods. This explains  both the  low mimber  of firms  and the low share  of output  and
employment.  For these industries,  then, the conventional  wisdom  about  Russian  industrial  concentra-
tion does  hold, although  the high concentration  is probably  just a consequence  of low priority, and
thus  low  output  and few  firms, rather  than  the explicit  intent  of the planners.
The final explanation  is that  some  industries  are smnall  because  they are relatively  new
industries. As of 1989,  the planners  had not  had the chance  to build many  enterprises  in these
industries,  plus, with new  technologies,  they  may  have  been reluctant  to invest  large amounts
initially. For example,  plastic  pipe  and plastic  foam  products  are two industries  that  have very few
firms  and thus  are very concentrated  in Russia,  but have  many  firns and low concentration  ratios  in
the U.S.  The closely  related  four-digit  industry,  plastic  bottles,  did not even  exist in Russia  in 1989.
Here, high concentration  is a consequence  of youth  and, thus, low  output  and few firms, rather  than
the explicit  intent  of the planners.
Understanding  these  three explanations  is very important. When  we can identify  the reasons
why  an industry  has a small  number  of firms,  we can then predict  which  industries  might indeed
suffer  from oligopolistic  behavior  after  price liberalization.  The new industries  likely  have  good
incentives  for entry and  sLould  not present  a problem,  but the others, especially  those  that produce
intermediate  goods, likely  represent  bo'.  "anecks  in the new economy. For these, the impact  of their
concentrto  will be greater  than  their share  of economic  activity  in general.
In sum, there is, in fact, a group  of industries  which  resemble  the conventional  wisdom  about
concentration  in the Russian  economy.  They represent,  however,  a small  share  of the economy.
There is another  group  which  appears  highly  concentrated  in our data, but in fact  these industries  art
augmented  by production  of civilian  goods  in the military-industrial  complex. Apart  from these
industries,  and even  including  those  augmented  by production  in the military-industrial  complex,
Russian  industry  is not highly  concentrated  when  measured  at the national  level. The vast majority  of
industries  have  enough  firms  that, with a national  market,  competition  should  exist. Although  this
seems  to contradict  the historical  evidence,  one feature  of the command  economy  does indeed  suggest
this result. As we explain  later, ministers  preferred  to keep entire  chains  of production  within  their
ministry  to minimize  reliance  on firms  outside  of their direct  control. Thus, for many  intermediate
goods,  each ministry  wanted  its own enterprise. For these industries,  we should  find at least as many
enterprises  as there  were ministries  that  used the products.
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Reality 5.6:  The-difference  between  Russian  and U.S. concentration  arises not in the largest
firms in each industry, but, rather, in the secondary  firms in bach  industry.
Here we use table 18 to look at specific comparisons  between four-digit industries. For many
industries,  the U.S. and Russia have very similar concentration  ratios, but Russia has only a fraction
of the firms that the U.S. does.  For example,  the CR4 and CR8 for the Russian storage-batteries
industry are only slightly different while  Russia has one tenth as many firms - 13 where the U.S. has
125. For farm machinery  and equipment,  Russia also has similar concentration  ratios, but only has
147 enterprises where the U.S. has 1,576. The U.S. and Russian ratios are about  similar for the
metal-cutting  machine  tools industry, but there are 381 such firms in the U.S. and only 51 in Russia.
Thus, while Russia does have fewer firms in each industry in general, that does not mean that
industries  are controlled  by oligopolies  any more so than in a market economy  like the U.S.  Rather,
for industries  with similar concentration  of large firms, the big differences  appear in the secondary
finns.  In the last example,  each secondary (ninth  largest or smaller) firm in the U.S. accounts for an
average  of .16 percent of sales, whie each in Russia accounts  fbr 1.26 percent
These findings are the logical conclusion  of the results of the analysis on enterprise size.
Russia is characterized  by medium and large firms, while the U.S. is characterized  by very small and
extra-large  firms.  So, we find that, while the large firms in Russia may represent the same share of
their industry that the extra-large  firms in the U.S. rpresent  of theirs, the remainder of the industry's
production in Russia is filled by a small number  of medium-sized  firms while that in the U.S. is filled
by a myriad of very small firms.  In terms of price competition,  these medium-sized  firns  are
probably more likely to compete  with the primary firms given a national  market in Russia than the
small ones do with the manmmoth  ones in the U.S.  This is good news for short-term monopoly
concerns  in Russia.  The small firms in the U.S., however, offer dynamic advantages  to the whole
industrial structure as we discuss above.
Myth 6:  The Russian economy  is controlled  by a large number of dominant
enterprises.
Reality 6:  Dominant enterprises  do not, in fact, dominate  the national  economy.
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In table 19, we present  the results  of analysis  using  the Russian  definition  of dominant
enterprise. This definition  was created  in thf context  of anti-monopoly  policy. An enterprise  is
dominant  if it commands  a 35 percent  or greater share  of its market. For the purposes  of policy,
markets  are defined  differently  for different  industries. Here, we start  by looking  at the national
market. We find that less  than 1 percent  of all enterprises  and less  than  4 percent  of all employment
are accounted  for by finns with 35 percent  or greater  market  shares  at the national  level. The results
are similar  when measured  using sales  except  that dominant  fiim sales as a percentage  of total is 7.6
percent. Some  of these  industries  have  more than  one dominant  firm. While such industries  would
be considered  concentrated  in the analysis  above, these  individual  firms  have less  market  power  than
if only one were dominant. The table shows  that, if we ignore industries  with two dominant  firms,
the share  of industries  with dominant  firms is somewhat  diminished.  Table  20 shows  dominant  firms
and dominated  industries  across  branches  of production. Four manufacturing  branches  seem  to cover
much  of the dominance:  electronics,  fabricated  metal,  instruments,  and paper.  Mining  also exhibits  a
high proportion of dominant firms and dominated industries.
4.  Barriers to Competition
In the preceding  section  we have  presented  evidence  that supports  our view that, at.the
national  level, industrial  concentration  - the presence  of too few firms  or of powerful  firms  - is not
responsible  for problems  of imperfect  competition  in Russia. This still  leaves  open  the question  of
whether  there are structural  impediments  to competition  in Russia. In this section,  we argue  that
important  barriers to competition  do exit in Russia. These  barriers, however,  are not the result  of
industrial  concentaon,  but rather are primarily  the result  of markets  that are highly  segmented. 43
Under  the prior regime,  enterprises  were  highly isolated,  divided  along  both ministerial  and,
often,  geographic  lines." In part, this segmentation  can be viewed  as a legacy  of central  planning.
Unfortunately,  certain  features  of the transition  environment  strengthen  these divisions,  undermining
3As  Ofer [1992:  91] points  out "...inertia in distribution  links and in supply  and marketing
routes, and the remaining  main core  of production  according  to ministerial  flat may  preserve
monopolistic  power  and produce  monopolistic  prices." Kahn  and Peck [1991:  66-67]  also emphasizes
that  problems  in distribution  may create  local  monopolies.
M Tis point  was noted  in the IMF-World  Bank-OECD-EBRD  joint study: "Even  where  more than
one enterprise  exists, the national  aggregates  hide  a high degree  of regional  monopoly  power that is
protected  by generally  poor communications  and transportation  and by administered  marketing
channels  which, in turn, are insulated  from one another  by ministerial  lines  of responsibility
[1991: 16].
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the efficient  distribution  of goods. In this  section,  we discuss  the nature  of these  segmentations,  both
ministerial  and geographic,  in more detail.
4.1  Ministerial Segmentation
The success  of central  planning  relied  on the ability  of planners  and industrial  ministers  to
retain control  over the important  decisions  of enterprises.  The roles of Gosplan  (the State  Planning
Committee)  and the industrial  ministries  in guiding  production  and investnent  decision  making  are
well known." Under  central  planning,  the distribution  of goods  was also coordinated  centrally,  by
Gossnab (the State Committee for Material Technical Supply).  Gossnab was responsible for creating
and managing  the wholesale  trade system,  including  identifying  appropriate  trading  partners,  setting
the contractual  terms of delivery,  and arranging  for the transportation  of goods.
This system  was designed  to allow  planners  at Gossnab  to control  the system  of distribution.
Preventing  enterprises  from developing  their own trading  links was an important  element  in limiting
enterprise  autonomy  and forcing  adherence  to the plan. Given  the sheer  size of the task of supply
control, Gossnab  planners  relied  heavily  on historic  linkages  between  enterprises  when  designing  their
distribution  plans. In many  cases,  this inertia  meant  that enterprises  were forced  to remain  in
relationships  that, over time, become  obsolete  due to the creation  of alternative  and potentially  more
appropriate  partners.
Moreover,  many  enterprises  were assigned  trading  partners  that were unable  tp fulfill  their
contractual  obligations  on a timely basis. This uncertainty  undermined  the ability  of enterprise
directors  to meet their production  targets  and, consequendy,  to receive  adequate  financial  rewards.
Unfortunately,  the economic  and legal structure  provided  little recourse  for the director,  pressing  him
or her to find alternative  sources  for important  inputs." In some  cases,  the director  independently
developed  the internal  capacity  to produce  the needed  inputs. In other  cases, the industrial  minister
took the initiative  and established  the capacity  to produce  important  inputs,  particularly  when so doing
'5For more infornation,  see Gregory  and Stuart [1986].
"One important  direction  this effort  took is the development  of informal  distribution  lines  between
enterprises. Most enteprises employed  a tolach (expediter)  whose  job it was to procure  inputs
through  informal  channels. Although  these efforts  were widespread,  they were formally  illegal,  and
inhibited  the development  of economy-wide  supply  information.  For more  on informal  aspects  of
plan  fulfillment,  see Powell  [1979].
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reduced his or her reliance on enterprises outside the ministry.'  This latter feature of central
planning alone suggests that, for important  commodities, there must be at least as many firms as there
are industrial ministries.
The dominant feature of this system of distribution  was the absence of institutions to provide
enterprises with the information  they would require to establish links with other firms on a
decentralized  basis.  In effect, Gossnab and the industrial ministries created a barrier to insulate
enterprises from their trading partners.  As a consequence, enterprises tended to become highly
isolated, without knowledge  of national and, in some cases, local market structure.
Vertical dependence among enterprises is, to a great extent, the consequence  of the arbitrary
demarcation  between processes in Soviet industry.  Enterprises within an industrial ministry can
usefiully  be thought of as processes aiong an assembly line.  While there are logical ways of dividing
of an assembly  line into its constituent  parts, ministers made divisions for reasons of control, rather
than economic rationality.  This is of little consequence  when the enterprises are subordinate to a
ministry that fits them together.  With the collapse of the industrial ministries enterprises are now free
to seek out new customers and new suppliers, but this ability is checked by the arbitrary ways in
which the assembly line is divided.  Enterprise directors suppose that they are tied to a vertical chain
that it is very difficult to escape from.
Thus, an important legacy of central planning is an industrial  structure that is highly
segmented based on historic trading relationships. We call this type of segmentation  ministerial
because it arose out of the ministerial system that included both Gossnab  and the industrial ministries.
Unfortunately, the information  problem that arose out of the ministerial system continues to persist
today.  Currently, much of distribution is organized by wholesale  organizations, many of which are
vestiges of the system of central planning.  They continue to distribute for the supply organizations
and industrial ministries to which they previously corresponded  even when the latter have been
privatized or decentralized. Thus, they act to maintain and reinforce the ministerial distinctions that
arose prior to the introduction  of markets.  Until new wholesale firms are created to compete with
these firms, old patterns of production and distribution are likely to persist.
" 7An  extreme example of this "ministerial autarky" occurs with respect to timber.  As described in
Hewett [1988: 173]: "Minergo (Energy and Electrification), for example, ships sawn timber produced
by construction  firms at the Bratsk and Krasnoiarsk hydroelectric stations in Siberia 3,000-5,000
kilometers  away to its enterprises in the European USSR.  Simultaneously  Minlesbumprom (timber,
pulp, paper, and wood) ships sawn timber to Siberia from its enterprises in the European USSR.'
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Ministerial segmentation  has important implications  for industrial concentration in the Russian
economy. It has produced well-defined  and persistent vertical linkages between enterprises, linkages
which, in some sense, can be considered a form of vertical integration.  As enterprises re-create the
vertical chains of the assembly  line, they represent both fewer and larger producers in the economy.
However, the vertical integration  that we observe in the Russian Federation is quite distinct from
vertical integration in western countries. In the Russian Federation, the integration  does not take a
legal form nor is it motivated  by conventional  economic  interests."  Rather, it is created by a lack of
knowledge  of alternative trading partners.  In the extreme, one could view the Russian economy as
segmented along historically determined chains of production, in which each firm in the chain may be
acting as both a monopsonist  and a monopolist. 4''  Once fims  become better informed about their
trading alternatives, we can expect some of the more inefficient  chains of production to break down. 5
4.2  Geographic Segmentation
Many markets in the Russian Federation, which one would naturally expect to be national,
are, in fact, regional or local.  In part, this geographic segmentation  is a vestige of the system of
central planning. In the prior regime, the production of many commodities  of lesser importance, such
as clothing or footwear, was planned by regional, not national, authorities, and thus these enterprises
are only experienced  in selling within local markets. Moreover, currentlv the distribution of these
'In  the Williamsonian  tradition the primary explanation  of vertical integration is the reduction in
transactions costs that occur when asset specificity  is present.  In the case of Russia, however, it is
not asset specificity, but the lack of knowledge  of alternative  suppliers and customers that creates the
potential for integration.
"Rughvir Khemani suggests that this type of market segmentation  offers another reason for
heterogeneity of firm size within industries, that is, a firm in a given industry was established or
maintained at the size necessary for its vertical, or ministerial, market regardle$s  of the sizes of other
firms in the same industry.
'CEd  Hewett [1988: 170-174]  discusses the reasons for strong vertical linkages as well as
physical vertical integration. He concludes, "As a consequence,  the successful enterprise is the
vertically integrated enterprise, and the successful ministry, the vertically integrated ministry."
5 "To  date most of the evidence  supporting the presence of ministerial segmentation  is anecdotal,
but non-contradicting. in fall 1992, we interviewed  75 firms across western Russia  The survey was
conducted by the authors in collaboration with Alan Gelb and I.J. Singh from the World Bank and
Valeriy Makarov and other economists from the Central Economics and Mathematics  Institute in
Moscow.  These interviews revealed that enterprise directors were often not aware of alternative
trading partners, even when they were known (by the interviewers) to exist.
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and other goods is arranged by the wholesale trade organizations  that we discuss above. In certain
areas, many of these wholesale  trade organizations have only single outlets that act as regional
monopolies. As a consequence,  the markets for certain goods are highly localized.' 2
Naturally, one expects that after liberalization, the size of the markets for these types of goods
will expand quickly.  However, certain features of the transition environment  suggest that some
barriers to this expansion  do exist.  Specifically,  some regional or oblasr  governments have
implemented  restrictions on the free flow of irater-oblast trade.  Such restrictions have historic
precedents in both legal and illegal activity. Under the prior regime, the transpormtion  of goods
between cities required special permits.  Any official could stop a truck and inspect its load to
determine whether the delivery was authorized or not.  And, if the delivery was, in fact,
unauthorized, the truck driver may have offered the official a bribe to ignore the transgression.
The use of licenses and other regulations to restrict the free flow of trade between oblasts
appears to persist during the transition, although in ways that are presently umneasurable- Much of
the evidence is anecdotal. Many obMast  governments have introduced explicit controls restricting the
export of important  goods from their region.  Typically, these governments still control the local
prices of important consumer commodities  and therefore require export restrictions in order to prevent
the flow of these conunodities into neighboring, high-price regions.  Private entrepreneurs often
complain that, in addition to these export restrictions, they encounter the extra cost of formnal  and
informal tariffs when transporting good across oblast borders.  However, the extent to which these
added costs are the consequence  of explicit policy is unknown.  The failure of the federal
government to invalidate  old laws and the activation of new, often conflicting,  laws provide local
officials with wide discretion in the enforcement of policy.  To some extent, local officials appear to
be using this lack of clarity to  collect bribes from firms engaged in the transportation of goods,
although, again, the pervasiveness  o. this phenomenon  is not known.
Barriers to inter-oblast  commerce also are created by problems in the system of
transportation. Unfortunately,  the present trasportation  system in the Russian Federation was
designed to support the unique institutions  of central planning.  Certain types of transportation
infrastructure, such as roadways, are presently underdeveloped  because they threatened the ability of
govermment  authorities  to maintain central control over economic  behavior.3 For example, nearly all
'2Kahn and Peck [1991: 66] emphasize the importance  of regional, as opposed to national,
markets as a barrier to competition.
"Gregory and Stuart [1986].
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transport  in terms of tonkilometers  is served  by trains and not by trucks. Trains are easier to
administer  and control  centrally,  while  trucks  require  roads. Roads  complicate  enforcement  of
restrictions  on internal  travel.  Moreover,  the present  system  of incentives  prevents  the efficient  use
of available  transportation.  For example,  central  control  over rail transportation  (and  the absence  of
freight-forwarding  institutions)  has led to conditions  where  freight  must be scheduled  at least six
months  in advance.
How important  are these  barriers  in creating  local  monopolies  and oligopolies?
Unfortunately,  we do not have  direct  evidence  that enables  us to identify  which  markets  have  become
localized.  Nor do we precisely  know  the level of localization  - the economic  region,  the oblast, or
the city or town. However,  we have  prepared  some  tables  to indicate  the potential  impact  of local
markets  on the presence  of imperfect  competition  in Russia  based  on the assumption  that geographic
segmentation  in Russia  is present.
To begin, refer  to table 21. Table  21 introduces  the reader  to the twelve  economic  regions
and describes  each  of them in terms  of their dependence  on particular  branches  of the civilian
economy. Table 19 shows  that, if markets  are segmented  based  on the twelve  economic  regions, a
larger share  of industries  have  dominant  firms.  They account  for about  10 percent  of firms and
about  one-third  of employment  and sales.  Ib table 22, we calculate  the number  of monopolies  and
oligopolies  that would  be present,  again  based  on the assumption  that markets  are largely  contained
within  economic  regions.  )We  find that in three major  economic  regions  - Chernozem,  Northwest,
and Volgo-Vyatka  - regional  monopolies  and oligopolies  may employ  nearly  half of all civilian
workers  or more. It is, of course,  not surprising  that as we disaggregate  on a geographical  level that
concentration  should  increase  because,  in the Soviet  period,  industrial  location  decisions  generally
were made  on ministerial,  not regional  lines.?
Much  of the anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that markets  may  even  be segmented  to a finer
geographic  level, to the oblasT  level or, in some  cases,  to the level  of the city  or town. Clearly,  the
smaller  the geographic  market,  the greater  the potential  for imperfect  competition.  Unfortunately,
high levels  of industrial  concentration  in localized  markets  not only  lead to higher  prices  and lower
output,  they  also exacerbate  the existing  probiems  of highly  localized  labor  markets. During  the
Soviet  period,  the government  severely  restricted internal  migration. Citizens  were issued  domestic
passports  and not permitted  free travel  outside  of their city  of residence. Thus labor markets  were
"The exception,  of course,  was the sovnarkhoz - regional  planning  ministries  - that were
implemented  by Khrushchev.  This experiment  ended  in 1964.
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limited  to cities  or towns  except  in the cases  where  the government  wanted  workers  to move, for
example  when it enticed  workers  to the Far East with  higher  wages. Currently,  although  the
migration  laws  have  changed,  the shortage  of housing  at current  prices  and other factors  continue  to
restrict  labor  mobility. As a consequence,  firms  that may  be monopolists  or oligopolists  in their local
goods  markets  may  also be monopsonists  or oligopsonists  in their local  labor markets.
Table  23 presents  statistics  that  describe  the average  number  of civilian  firms  and industries  in
both oblasts  and in cities  or towns. This table suggests  that, while  oblasts  contain  many  firms, they
also contain  many  industries. Thus, although  oblasts  may  be industrially  diverse,  the presence  of
barriers  to free trade suggests  that many  of these  industries  may be local monopolies  or oligopolies.
This feature  has mixed  implications  for reform. With industrial  diversity,  oblasts  are relatively
insulated  from economic  shocks  that affect  particular  .ndustries, such as shocks  to certain  types  of
heavy  industry.  On the other  hand, the presence  of local concentration  raises  political  pressure  for
price controls,  regulations,  and other  forms anti-monopoly  policy  that may  impede  the progress  of
economic  reform.
A potentially  more  important  problem  is the number  of towns  in Russia  with very few
industries  or enterprises. More than  90 percent  of all cities  and towns  in Russia  have  nine or fewer
civilian  firms  or industies. Further,  as shown  in table 24, almost  one-half  of all cities  have  only one
firm and more  than three-quarters  have  four firms  or fewer. In an ervironment  with  labor mobility
and little market  segmentation,  the particular  spatial  distribution  of firms  would  not pose a serious
threat  to reform. Under  such  conditions,  even  if the only employer  in the town shuts  down, workers
can  -find  employment  elsewhere. However,  when  labor is highly immobile, 55 entire cities  and towns
are open to potentially  large  unemployment  shocks,  if the dominant  local industry  experiences  a
downturn. Under  these conditions,  workers  in these  firms  are likely  to pressure  their  local
govermnents  to intervene  and try to find  them subsidies,  undermining  the process  of micro-
adjustment.  Although  there are many  cities  with four firms  or fewer,  these  cities  accodnt  for only
12.2 percent  of all civilian  employment  in industry. Typically,  these cities  are small  towns that
predominantly  host  small firms. In table 25, we observe  that  the largest  firms are not in cities  with
four finms  or less. They tend to be in cities  with a moderate  number  of other firms,  suggesting  that
55The issue, of course,  is whether  observed  low mobility  of labor in Russia  is due to a lack of
inter-regional  employment  that resulted  from the absence  of enterprise  failure  under  the old regime,
or whether  this is due to impediments  to labor  mobility,  such as lack  of housing. The latter effect
seems  to be very important  in Russia.
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either  larger  firms  require  complementary  goods  to be produced  or the local  work  force  requires  a
sufficiently  diversified  local  economy. m
We emphasize  that local  monopolies  and  oligopolies  in these  cities  and  towns  exist  only as a
consequence  of segmented  markets,  not as a consequence  of having  too few  firms  in their particular
industries.  In table  26, we present  statistics  on the  potential  competitiveness  of industries  in cities  of
different  sizes.  We find  that  very  few  firms  in cities  with  four  firms  or fewer  are in industries  that
are highly  concentrated  when  measured  at the national  level. In fact, most  of the firms  in cities  and
towns  with  few  firms  are in industries  with many  firms. This  fact  suggests  either  that  these  firms  are
in industries  that  naturally  serve  only  local markets  (such  as bakeries),  or that these  firms  are in
industries  that, with improvements  in the system  of distribution,  are potentially  very  competitive.
S.  Implications  for Economic  Reform
The hct that  barriers  to competition  in Russia  arise,  not  from industrial  concentration  at the
national  level,  but from ministerial  and  geographic  segmentation  of markets,  has important'
implications  for economic  reform. We now  turn to the implications  of our findings  for competition
policy  and  economic  reform.
With  respect  to competition  policy,  a whole  set of issues  arises  surrounding  the relative
importance  and appropriate  timing  of anti-trust  policies. Contestable  markets  theory  argues  that the
facilitation  of free entry  and exit  alone  should  induce  competitive  behavior  in firms  'through  the threat
of entry. Even  when  monopoly  power  is exercised,  many  would  contend  that, in the Russian  case,
the conventionally  measured  welfare  losses  are less  than  the benefits  from  faster  privatization  due  to
the attractiveness  of owning  monopolies  and  oligopolies.  Moreover,  if the threat  of entry  does  not
inhibit  monopoly  profits,  these  profits  will attract  new  entry  into  the market. Thus, the govermnent
should  keep  its hands off enterprises.
Although  entry  and  the threat  of entry  are important  mechanisms  for eliminating  the
concentration  problems  imposed  by highly  segmented  markets,  there are nonetheless  good  reasons  for
considering  the role of an active  competition  policy  in Russia. Three  features  of the current
environment  suggest  that enterprise  directors  will not perceive  a threat  for entry  or will not care.
Thus,  the persistence  of non-competitive  behavior  may  warrant  competition  policy. First, the
S6 It should  be noted  that'in  some  of these  small  cities  there  may  be military  enterprises  that  are
not included  in our data  set. Such  additional  firms  as do exist  would  mitigate  the vulnerability  of
those  towns  to potentially  volatile  local  markets.
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enviroment  is very uncertain. 'This  uncertainty.tends  to shrink the time horizon for decisionmakers.
In this case, enterprise directors will substantially  discount  the future fall in profits which could be the
result of attracting entry or regulation in the current period.  Second, directors realize that the lejal
and administrative  complexity  of starting a new firm acts as an effective barrier against many
potential entrants into their markets.  Third, the high cost of capital (to agents not in the state sector)
and the difficulties in acquiring facilities make it very difficult to start up new businesses!,
In certain cases then, an active competition  policy may be warranted.  It then becomes
important to design the policy appropriately. This clearly depends on the causes of imperfect
competition.  We argue that traditional anti-trust policies are inappropriate when the sources of
imperfect competition  are ministerial and geographic segmentation.
Anti-trust policy in Russia includes  two types of distinct actions. First, the Russian
government has established anti-monopoly  committees  at regional and local levels.  These committees
use product categories and current relevant market sizes to identify "monopolies"  - those firms with a
35 percent or more market share - to be regulated.  Anti-monopoly  price regulations are based on
the belief that this market power comes  from industrial stmcture.  However, as we have emphasized,
the dominant cause of market power is market segmentation. Not only do price regulations fail to
address the real problern then, they probably exacerbate it by eliminating  gains from inter-regional
trade and therefore reinforcing the segmentation. This type of regulation  is also vulnerable to a
degree of mismanagement  and corruption which could pose a real threat to the process of enterprise
reform in Russia.  Any flexibility that local officials have in defining markets provides them with
wide discretion in identifying  firms and thus, provides them with a tool to potentially punish any firm
that pursues its own, rather than the government's, objectives.
Second, anti-trust activity often involves breaking up lar!,er firms into smaller ones.  In the
case of Russia, this type of action is often discussed in the context of privatization. The idea that
monopolistic  or oligopolistic  firms should bebroken apart into smaller enterprises is partly based on
the conventional  belief that these firns  are inefficiently  large.  Fawever, as we show above, the
evidence does not support this belief.  Thus, we question  the ability of the government to determine,
ex ante, the appropriate size for firms in an industry.  We also question whether the government has
sufficient information to be able to determine, ex ante,  whether a particular organizational  structure is
suited for market competition.
" 7Iis  factor is clearly more important in sectors where the minimum  efficient scale of the firm is
large.  Hence new entry in the retail sector has been quite dramatic.
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Moreover,  when the real probWen  is market  segmentation,  it is not at all clear that breaking
up enterprises  will add to the effective  number  of potential  competitors  in the market.  The breakup
of a large enterprise  will not produce  several identical  small enterprises. In most cases, it will
involve the breakup  of an integrated  enterprise  into its parts.  If the market is segmented,  this policy
will merely reproduce  vertical dependence,  as the former constituents  of the enterprise  will have still
rely heavily on each other.  The optimal  policy under  such conditions  must involve  measures  that
reduce the segmentation  of markets (we discuss  these types of measures  below).
Moreover,  both types of anti-trust  policies  often target specific  sectors, in which the effects  of
high prices create important  economic  or political  consequences. For example, these  policies may
target finns in one part of a chain of production  only, such as in light industry. If this is the case,
then anti-trust  policy  runs the risk of creating  worse market structures  than those that are currendy in
place.  For example, in most cases, firms are engaged  in trade relationships  which can be
characterized  as bilateral  monopolies. They purchase  inputs  from a limited  number  of firms that, in
urn, sell to only a limited  number of customers. Thus, there is a mutual  dependency  between the
supplier  and the customer. If, say, the limited number  of customers  are divided into many direct
competitors,  then a power asymmetry  is created, in which many downstream  firms compete  for a
limited  number  of upstream  supplies. In this case, the relative  bargaining  power of the upstream
producer is increased  and the costs of imperfect  competition  may be increased. Ignoring  the role of
market segmentation  in creating imperfect  competition  can thus lead to anti-trust  pblicies  that
exacerbate  the situation.
The effectiveness  of import competition  as a remedy for market power  depends  on two
features of the economy. First, the economy  must be open.  Second, the economy  must have a good
distribution  system. Imported  goods cannot  easily flow into countries  lacking  seaports, airports, train
stations,  and other centers  of trade.  The absence  of such a system in Russia is at the center of our
discussion  of imperfect  competition. In our view, ministerial  and geographic  segmentation  forces
trading relationships  to be backward  looking,  promoting  the maintenance  of relationships  developed
under central planning,  rather than new ones.  To promote  enterprise-adjustment,  a distribution
system must exist that is forward looking. This requires  no unnecessary  restrictions  on the flow of
domestic  trade; a good network  of wholesale  and retail enterprises  to link producers  with customers;
a good information  system  to allow firms to identify  potential  suppliers  and customers;  and a good
transportation  system  to move goods from the place  of production  to the place  of consumption;  a
good storage system  to hold goods, to separate  the time of production  from the time of consumption;
a good communication  system  to allow  firms to negotiate  and modify  contracts  as needs change; a
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rapid payments  and settlements  system to facilitate  financial  compensation  for products  or services
provided; and, a system  of enforceable  contract  law to enable  firms with no  history of relations  to
contract  with one another. Unfortunately,  the Russian economy  is faced with oblast-level  restrictions
on commerce;  wholesale-  and retail-trade  monopolies  (and  barriers to entry in wholesale  and retail
trade); poor infrastructure  and poor incentives  in infrastructure  (information,  transportation,
communication,  storage);  long delays in the payment  and settements system;  and the absence  of an
enforceable  system of contract  law.
Improvements  in the system of distribution  would require a combination  of investment  in
public infrastructure,  improvements  in the legal system, some  privatization,  and, most importantly,
elimination  of all barriers to free internal  trade and free entry.'  Moreover,  by improving
distribution,  the creation  of small trading firms will facilitate  the entry of new industrial  firms."  We
would expect  that these  new firms will become  an important  source of innovation  in the economy.Y
As more small new firms enter, we also anticipate  that the size distribution  of industrial  finms  will
change  to reflect a more-market-oriented  industrial  structure.
6.  Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented  evidence  that calls into question  the conventional  wisdom
that Russia  suffers  from excessive  industrial  concentration. Concentration,  measured  at the national
level, is not significantly  (in an economic  sense)  greater in Russia  than in the United  States. While
this indicates  that  Russia does not suffer from the problem  of gigantomania  - that is, production
concentrated  in a few very large enterprises  - national  comparisons  may obscure  important  issues
when distribution  is costly and information  is poor. Indeed, we have argued  that the major barriers to
competition  that do exist in Russia, arise from market and geographic  segmentation.
5'  Free entry, to the extent  that it leads to the expansion  of previously  repressed sectors  of the
economy  - such as services and communications  - may also play an important  role in mitigating  the
consequences  of reductions  in employment  in industry  that are associated  with restructuring.
54One  potential  source of new entrants that could  play an important  role is the MIC.  The decline
in orders for MIC output provides  incentives  for entry into civilian  industry. Moreover,  the natural
industries  to enter are those where profits are high. This suggests  that the MIC will be a dynamic
source of competition  in Russia.
1DDearden,  Ickes, and Samuelson  (1990]  show  that the cost of inducing  innovation  is increasing  in
the amount  of hierarchy, and use this to explain  the slow rate of innovation  adoption  in Soviet
industry.
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Analysis  of market structure  in Russia is important  for understanding  economic  refrmn.
Market  segmeniation  has created  a situation  where enterprise  directors  believe  that they are dependent
on a small number  of customers  and suppliers. This makes  the transition  environment  much more
uncertain, and thus inhibits  adjustment  to the market.
It is often argued, that privatization  of state-owned  enterprises  will lead to improved  economic
performance  solely because  ownership  will provide the proper incentives.  It seems  unlikely, however,
that without  competitive  pressures,  ownership  alone will be sufficient  to change  behavior.
Enterprises  bent on survival  will minimize  changes  that entail significant  risks.  Consequently,  it will
be critical to remove  the barriers to competition  that exist in Russia. This means  that it is crucial to
know  the sources of these  barriers.  Our analysis  strongly  suggests  that marker  infrastrucrure  -
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42Table'
1989 densus of Manufacturers
Nuinher.ct..  hCliuracteftics  of.irm
.Industrial  Hrms  Epvmn  - S
|921.391  Mean  643  2 Digit  39
TotaLl  Eniploynmnt  . Median  211  3 Digit  180
In Industrial  Fimr  . Minimum  1  4 Digit  406
13,751,839  Maximum  100,605  5 Digit  489
Range  100,604
4374  Variance  4,578,015
t_4m  0hlas  I  Coef of Var  332.82
78
!  *  - ..  |I  .: Fum Sazfe  .,  *  .*  .- :. 
9IDigit.SIC.  :  . Smail  :MbdiuIm  .:z  argw.. lotai.
Agriculture  1411  122  15  3  1551
Mining  & Canstruction  307  259  140  25  731
Manufacturing:
food,  textiles,  wood,
print,  chemicals  6518  4049  . 1082  14  11663
ManufacturinT.
rubber,  leather
glass,  metals,  M&E  1410  2750  1304  69  5533
Transpart  and  Util.'s  238  572  84  1  895
Trade  1  0  0  0  1
Fire,  Insurance,
Real  Estate  0  0  0  0  0
Services:
business,  repair  430  515  65  1  1011
Services,
health,  education  2  1  0  0  3
Public  Administration  2  1  0  0  3
Total  10319  8269  2690  113  21391
Table  prepared  by  A.  Brown,  B.  Ickes,  and  R.  Ryterman.
43Table  2. Estimates  of Mean  Employment  by Finns  in  the
Military-lndustrial Complex  in Russia for 1989
Number  of  Mean  Employ-
Sector  Employment  Enterprses  mnent  Per  Finn
Civilian  Industry  13,751,839  21,391  643
of which  Heavy  Civilian  Industry  4,250,750  2,429  1,750
MIC  7,979,161  5,309  1,503
Estimated  MIC  9,289,726  5,309  1,750
All  Industry  21,731,000  26,700  814
Sources:  Goskomstat  Ecnoamic  Yearbook  for  1990  and  PlanEcon  data.
44Table 3.  Aggegate  Industrial Concentration  Pattems  in 1985
Average Size of Leading  Fi;ms  Leading Company  Employment
INumber  of Employeesl  as a Percent of Total Industrial
E_nployment fin %)
Top 10  Top 20  Top 10  Top 20
Nation
United States  310,554  219,748  13.1  18.6
Japan  107,106  72,240  7.3  9.9
West Germany  177,173  114,542  20.1  26.0
United Kingdom  141,156  '108.010  23.1  35.3
France  116,049  81,381  23.2  32.5
South Korea  54,416  n.a.  14.9  n.a.
Canada  36,990  26,414  15.3  21.9
Switzerland  60,039  36,602  49.4  60.2
Holland  84,884  47,783  84.5  95.1
Sweden  48,538  32,893  49.4  66.9
Russia  (1989)  62,649  48,133  4.6  7.0
U.S. statistics based on company  data.
Sources: Scherer and Ross (1990, p. 631  and PlanEcon  data.
Table prepared  by A. Brown, B. Ickes, and R. Ryterman
45Table  4. Comparison  of the  Size  Distibutions  of Russian  and  U.S.  Manufacturing  Finns
Size  dam by  employment
Small  Medium  Large  Ex-large  Total
Caurnry Statistic  1-249  250-959  lOUD-  1000
_  9999  or mar
Russia  Number  of  firms  9,065  5,662  2,386  83  17,196
Witho  &mat&edHMC`  10.374  7,651  4,292  188  22,505
As  a percent of total
number  af firms  52.7  32.9  13.9  0.5  100.O
in manaucturin*
*Wth  estdated£fIC  46.1  34.0  19.1  0.8  100.0
US.  Number  of  firms  299.666  5.530  1,657  267  307.120
As  a percent of  totl
number  of firms  97.6  1.0  0.5  0.1  100.0
in mandacturing
Russia  Numberof  workers  974.721  2.874,640  5911.370  1.758.320  11.519,051
with estimatedMtC  1,151.649  3.959.560  11,440,500  4.257.068  20,808,777
As . percent  of  tatl
number  of  workers  8.5  25.0  51.3  15.3  100.0
in mnmufacturing
with  esanstagd  MIC  5.5  19.0  55.0  205  100.0
U.S.  Number  of  workers  5,777.592  2519.572  4,518.667  8.632.159  21.447.990
As  a percent  of  total
number  df  workers  26.9  11.7  21.1  40.2  100.0
in mnufacturig
Rusia  Avg.#ofworkes  100  - 508  2.478  21.185  670
U.S.  Avg.  Xof workers  19  456  2.727  32.330  70
'U.S.  data  are fronm  U.S.  Census  1987  Enterprise  Statistcs  and  are  company  data.
"See Table  2 and  the  text  for explanation
Table  prepared  by  A.Brown,  B.  Ickes,  and  R.  Byterman
467 ble  5. Com.parison  of the Size  Distribution  of Russian  and  U.S.  Small  Manufacturing  Firms
Sbe  cion by employment
ountry  Statistic  14  5 9  10-19  20149  50 99  100-249  Total
ussia  Number  af  firms  27  205  512  1.386  2A476  4A459  9.065
with xtifiat;dMIC`  27  207  521  1,517  2762  5,340  10.374
As  a porcent  of tobl
number  of small  firnm  0.3  2.3  5.6  15.3  27.3  49.2  100.0
in manufacturing
bwth  esdmated  MIC  0.3  2.0  50  14.6  26.6  51.5  10;0.
.S.  Numberof  firns  112,926  58S598  32,158  65.834  18.661  11.489  299.666
As a percent of total
number  of small firms  37.7  19.6  10.7  22.0  62  3.8  100.0
in manufacturing_
usia  Number  of worker  76  1,513  7,435  48,645  180,81E  736.237  974.721
i,tb estimafifdAC  76  1,533  7,576  53,336  202.165  88963  1,151.649
As a prment of total
number  of workers  0.0  0.2  0.8  5.0  18.6  75.5  100.0
in manufacturing
small  firms
*  with estizatidiC  0.0  0.1  0.7  4.6  17.6  77.0  100.0
.S.  Number  of worker  215.443  394,067  378,180  1,750.874  1.289.853  1,749,175  5.777,592
As  a percent  of total
number  of workrs  3.7  68  6.5  30.3  22.3  - 30.3  100.0
in manufaturing
small  finm
-Issia  Avg.#eof  workers  3  7  15  35  73  165  108
.S.  Avg.  # of wrken  2  7  12  27  ..69  152  19
J.S.  data  are  from  the  U.S.  Cansus  1987  Entepripse  Statistics  and  aro  company  data.
'See Table  2 and  the  text  far explanation.
3b1s  prepared  by  A.  Brown,  B. lcides,  and  R.  Rytarman
47Table  6. Comparison  of  the  Size  Distribution  of Russian  and  U.S.  Manufacturing  Firnns
Size  dm by  employmeit
Country  Statiodo  148  501699  1009249  2S0.99  1000.  ioaao  Total
9999  or more
fluei.  Numbar  of firms  2,130  2,476  4,459  5,662  2,386  83  17,196
witFt  extjaadNX"e  2,Z72  Z782  5,340  7,651  4  4,292  188  272505
As  a percnt of total
numbr  of  firm  12.4  14.4  25.9  32.9  13.9  0.5  100.0
in manufacturing
M*tk4w&tad Mx  10.1  12.3  23.7  34.0  19.1  0.8  1O0.0
US.  Number  of finmn  269.516  18,661  11,489  5,530  1,657  267  307.120
As  * percent  of htol
numler  of firmn  87.5  8.1  3.7  1.8  0.5  0.1  100.G
in  manufacturinng
Renem  Humbwrofwmrkwe  57,669  180.815  736,237  2.074,640  5,911,370  1,758.320  11.519,051
w  M  A:  estiwatdMiC  62szZi  202,165  886,963  3.959,560  11.440,50a  4,257,068  20.808,777
As  a pernt  of  tol
number  af merka  0.5  1.9  6.4  25.0  51.3  15.3  100.0
in manufactnring
firms
with  aujavatad  ifX  0.3  1.0  4.3  19.0  55.0  205  100.0
U.S.  Number  of workes  2,73B.564  1,28.853  1,749,175  2.S19,572  4,518,667  8,63Z,159  21,447,990
An  a percet of total
number of  wrker  12.8  LO  8.2  11-7  21.1  40.2  1W.0
in m  ufacturing
firms
nue.a  Avg.Dof  workser  27  73  165  508  2475  21185  670
U.S.  Avg.fofw  wrke  10  6a  152  456  2727  32330  70
US.  data  an fom U.S.  C  1987  Eueiesa  Stabis  an - cunpan  daa
*'Se  Tdd 2 and  t  test fr  mnIaiaueL
Tabl  ppad  by  A.Drown,  B.  ldwks,  m R.  Ryutmn  n
48Table  7. Size  Characteristics  of Firms  by  Industrial  Branch.s  In  Russia  In  1989
Number  of Firms  hr Employment  I  e  Shari  o1  Share  of Drench  Employmauth  bSIzr'  Share  of
Branch  Small Medium  Large Ex-Large  NFirms  Total  Fitm.  Small  Madlum  Large  Ex-Lurge  Total  Em
Agricullura'  1411  122  t5  3  1551  7.3  39.7  19.9  25.4  15.0  1.6
Apparel  225  445  144  0  814  3.8  5.0  .38.2  56.9  0.0  3.8
Chemicals  103  188  150  5  454  2.1  1.9  14.2  75.0  8.9  4.9
Construction'  40  25  3  0  68 . 0.3  21.6  55.3  23.2  0.0  0.1
Electronics  37  100  118  3  256  1.2  1.1  11.1  78.8  9.0  . 3.2
Fabricated  Metal  13  305  72  3  553  2.6  5.9  36.7  44.0  13.4  2.8
.2'  9  #  a i,w,,  3  09.c  t
furnitulre  110  218  62  0  390  1.8  6.7  42.5  51.8  0.0  1.7
K  ......  :idT 5.4.Y . w a§fr'  ;..TWTh  ,..,  1;-  .4.S.  ..  Yi~A
Instfuments  117  95  69  1  252  1.3  3.4  . 17.9  74.6  4.0  2.0
Leather  64  123  73  0  260  1.2  3.4  24.6  72.0  0.0  1.7
Al.t.  .-ffV  ,.&IV t
Minlng"  2j7  234  137  25  683  3.1  2.3  9.4  37.8  50.5  8.0
Miscellmneous  96  217  43  0  356  1.7  6.8  54.2  39.0  0.0  1.3
Paper  38  62  57  0  157  0.7  2.4  14.7  . 82.9  0.0  1.4
Petroleum  20  35  25  2  82  0.4  2.0  - 13.6  62.1  22.3  1.0
Printing  1256  146  22  0  1424  6.7  29.2  42.8  28.0  0.0  1.0
Rubber  24  89  50  3  176  0.8  1.2  16.9  68.7  '  13.2  2.0
Servicesc  430  GIs  65  . 1011  4.7  11.3  56.2  29.8  3.0  2.8
..  ;2P:  :  . r  ;  . 421.7;,  . > 
Tgri'6  r  ;  4 r  94;  24>  :2i2  r.  ;[c i.  ?  J  601  15ii  :"  .62  78 .r;:{  .3  -*  8.
Tobacco  3  22  3  0  28  0.1  1.2  72.8  26.0  0.0  0.1
Transportation'  238  572  84  1  895  4.2  5.0  54.4  37.5  3.1  3.6
Others?  5  2  0  a  7  0  31.6  60.4  0.0  0.0  0.0
Total  10319  8269  2690  113  21391  100  6.6  27.5  48.7  17.3  100.0
*Small:  Employ  < 200,  Medium:  200< -Employ  < 1000,  Large:  1000<  -Employ  c 10,000.  Large:  10,000<  -Employ.
'Non-manufacturing  branches.
able  prepared  by  A.  Brown,  0.  Ickae.  and  R.  Ryrerman.Table  8. Characteristics  of the  Largest  Firms  by  Employment  in Russia  in 1989
Characteristic  Statistic  To  10  Top  25  Top  50  ToP  100 All Ex-large-
Separate  Oblasts  Number  7  14  26  37  39
Separata  Branches  Number  4  4  8  15  15
Separate  4-digit
Industries  Number  4  9  22  40  46
Employment  %  of Total  4.6  8.0  11.6  ti 6.3 17.3
Mean  62,649  43,966  31,958  22,421  21,027
Employment  with  % of Total  4.0  7.1  10.2  14.3  20.8
est  rimtedMlC  Mean  92,698  65,561  46,899  33,001  22,073
Employment  Share
of Total  Sample',  Mean  15.8  17.3  17.5  15.5  15.8
Employment  Share
of Regional  Sample  Mean  50.0  53.2  54.1  53.7  55.0
Output  %  of Total  4.2  9.8  14.4  21.6  22.9
Mean  1860.7  1734.9  1273.3  952.9  895.2
Output  Share  of
Total  Sample  Mean  16.9  .19.0  18.8  16.0  16.7
Output  Share  of
Regional  Sample  Mean  51.3  52.6  55.1  54.5  55.9
'Exlarge  refers  to enterprises  with  greater  than  10,000  employees,  of which  there  are  1  13  in  the  PlanEcon
sample  and  217  in  the  sample  with  the estimated  MIC-.
See  Table  2 and  the  text  for explanation.
-The  share  statistics  are  the  means  over  enterprises  of each  enterprise's  market  share  within  its 4-digit  industry
as  measured  by  the  given  variable  far  the given  market.
Notes:
46  of the  top 50  enterprises  represent  only  four  branches.  The  other  four  enterprises  are  each  from
separate  branches  making  the  total  branches  represented  eight.
In the  top  50  there  are  only  six  enterprises  which  are  dominant  nationally,  that is only  six  with  greater  than  or
equal  to 35%  employment  share  of the  sample.  There  are  only  eight  which  are  dominant  in  terms  of sales.
In the  top  50,  35  enterprises  are  dominant  in  terms  of employment  in  their  regional  market,  and  33 are  doaiinant
in  terms  of sales  in  their  regional  market.
The  biggest  drip in  employment  size  is between  the  third  and  fouth  enterprises  going  from  88969  to 58379.
Only  one-third  of the  extra-large  enterprises  have  employment  between  20,000  and  100,605,  while  the  other
two-thirds  have  employment  between  10,000  and  20,000.
Kemerovskaya  Oblast  has  the  largest  share  of very  big  enterprses;  it contains  six  of the  top  25 and  seven
uf the  top  50..
Table  prepared  by  A.  Brown,  B.  Ickes,  and  R.  Ryterman.
50Table  9. Aggregate  Concenration  Shares  in the  U.S.  and  Russia
Shr  of  f100  Sere of 200
Larvgot  Larpxt
Manu_ming  Manufnuti'no
Nation  Siz Meumre  Cepeaden  An  %I  Cepuudu  tin%)
United  Stat.s  Domdic  vlw  uedded  32  43.2
tl9U21  1nDesde  plant  suln  31.1  44.0
Enloymimt  in  the U.S  23.8  32.
Ru#ia  Emnplynwnt  in  nmnufacturin  15.7  23.4
(1919)
U.S.  data  are  astablishment  data.
Sources  Scherer  and  Ross  [1990,  p.  591  and  PlanEcon  data.
Table  prepared  by  A.  Brown,  B.  Ickes,  and  IL  RytenMan.
5L
51Table  1  0. Aggregate  Concentration  in Russian  and  U.S.  Manufacturing
Perent of manufacturing  sales  accounted  for by-
lumber of  4 largest  8 largest  20 largest  50 largest
Nation  Companies  companies  companies  companies  companies
Russia  17,196  6  9  15  24
(1989)
United  States  310,341  9  12  18  27
(1987)  .v -. __. 
U.S.  data is company  data.
Sources U.S.  Census  Bureau  1987  Concentration  Ratios  in Manufacturing  and PlanEcon  data.
Table  prepared  by A.  Brown,  B.  Ickes,  and  R. Ryterman.
52Table  11.  Measures  of Industrial  Concentration  of Firms  in  Russia  In  1909
Value  of Statfstic  for  Industries  * with  the  FollowingNumher  of firms
Measure  of  mor
Concentration  Statlslti  1  3  4  6to 10  it  la20  2ItO50  51to 100 than  100
Number  of Industiies  43  24  1  .:  21. . 80  75  63  34  - 472
Percent  of all  Industries  Frequency  1'1.11  6.9  4.7  8.2  19.7  18.5  15.5  8.4:.
Cumulative  10.6  1G.5  21.2  :25.  48.1  64.8  80.0  88.5  1EB.O.
Number  of Firms  43  48  57'  .B4  598  1134  2014  2382 .lE3i.
Percent  of all  Firms  Frequency  n.2  0.?  0-  3--  0.4  2.8  5.3  9.4  11.1  7.3.3
cumulative  . .2  0.4  0  .0.71d:.  3.9  9.2  18.B  29.7  c.0 -
Labor  Force  Percent  of Labor  Employed
Inumber  of workers)  by  Industries:
Frequency  D.23  0.38  0.49?  . 0.03  10.52  13.27  18.53  13.94  41982
Cumulative  0 22;  0.60  10  9  2  1,92  12.44  25.71  44.24  58.18.  100iO.
Charecteristics  of Employment
in Firms  in Industries:
Mean  720  1091  1181,.,  1556  2420  1609  1265  805  s  -
Median  255  481  271'  .422  694  505  432  3011
Minimum  ~2  10  7~1  >
Maximum  7.e0  9421  10278  4  100605  48905  '  45904  20845  !.  546
Range  7'E0  9411  10271  E  100597  48904  45898  20841 8454ts
Industries  are  measured  at Ihe  4-digil  SIC  level.
Table  prepared  by  A.  Brown,  B.  Ickes,  and  R.  Ryterman.Table  12. Frequency  of Firms  by Size  In  Industrial  Concentration  Classes
Size  by  Frequency  of Firms  in  Industries  with  the  Following  Number  of Firms
Employment  1  2  3  4  5to10  11to20 21to5051tolIOU  >100  Total
Small
IE  < 200)  15  11  24  27  101  203  514  904  8460  10319
Medium
(200<  -E<  10001  1  7  25  16  30  258  489  048  1022  5468  8269
Large
11000<  -E<  10,000)  11  12  1B  28  210  354  510  448  I0B7  2690
Extra  Large
(E>-10,000)  0  0  1  20  28  35  10  18  113
Total  43  48  67  84  598  1134  2014  2382  15031 21391
Un
size  by  Frequency  of Firms  in  Industries  with  the  Following  Four*Firm  Concentration  Ratios
(mployment  91-100%  81-90%  71-80%  61-70% 51-60%  41-150%  31-40% 21-30%  11-20%  0 10%  Total
Small
I(E<200)  97  58  g0  133  127  184  284  912  1i29  6699  10319
Medium
(200  < -E  <  1000_  138  87  187  220  277  338  484  1032  1946  3582  8269
Large
(1000<  -E  <10,0I0)  92  58  151  118  254  187  314  531  513  472  2690
Extra  Large
(E>  -1I0,IJO)  8  9  8  14  25  6  32  a  5  0  113
Total  333  212  422  485  883  713  1114  2483  4193  10753  21391
The  four-firm  concentration  ratio  Is  the  employment  of the  four  largest  flirms  as  a percent  of total  employment  in  the  Industry.
Tablp  prepared  by  A.  Brown,  B.  Ickes,  and  R.  Ryterman.Table  13.  U.S.  and Russian Concentration Ratios Based on SALES
Twu.diglt  Fmur.finu  Eight.fin
Industry  U.S.  Rush  U.S.  Ru.i.
Industry  _  Code  (19971  (19138  (15975 il989
FODO  ANO  KINDRED  PRODUCTS  20  la  11  19  15
TOBACCO  PROOUCTS  21  92  42  97  61
TEXTILE  MILL  PRODUCTS  22  17  a  29  13
APPAREL  AND  OTHER  TEXTILE  PRODUCTS  23  10  6  13  11
LUMBER  AND  WOOD  PRODUCTS  24  10  4  14  7
FURNITURE  AND  FIXTURES  25  20  11  25  18
PAPER  AND  ALUED  PRODUCTS  25  25  34  39  53
PUBLISHING  AND  PRINTING  21  a  16  14  23
CHEMICALS  AND  ALLIEO  PRODUCTS  28  19  13  26  22
PETROLEUM  ANO  COAL  PRODUCTS  29  29  41  61  62
RUBBER  AND  MISCELLANEOUS  PLASTCS  PROD.  30  16  25  22  36
LEATHER  ANO  LEATHER  PRODUCTS  31  11  21  16  31
STONE.  CLAY.  AND  GLASS  PRODUCTS  32  17  3  26  6
PRIMARY  METAL  INDUSTRIES  33  25  30  36  46
FABRICATED  METAL  PRODUCTS  34  9  24  13  32
INDUSTRIAL  MACHINERY  AND  EQUIPMENT  35  22  12  28  1a
ELECTRICAL  AND  OTHER  ELECTRONIC  EQUIP.  36  19  11  29  19
TRANSPORTATION  EQUIPMENT  37  46  46  60  55
INSTRUMENTS  ANO  RELATED  PRODUCTS  38  29  24  44  34
MISCELLANEOUS  MANUFACTURING  INDUSTRIES  39  7  10O  10  17
Sources  U.S.  Bureau  at  die  Caom  Company  Summary  (19871  and  PhoEcan  data
Table  prepared  by  A.  Brown,  B.  Icbas  and  R.  Rylhmu
Tahle 14.  U.S.  and Russian Concentration Ratios  Based  on EMPLOYMENT
Tw.digit  Four-firm  E_ghft-irm
tndutuy  U.S.  Russ  U.S.  RuB  h
Industry  Cade  (18971  (18389  (19871 (19891
FOOD  AND  KINDRED  PRODUCTS  20  9  4  1i  6
TOBACCO  PRODUCTS  21  92  33  91  53
TEXTILE  MILL  PRODUCTS  22  19  5  29  9
APPAREL  AND  OTHER  TEXTILE  PRODUCTS  23  10  6  13  10
LUMBER  AND  WOOD  PRODUCTS  24  7  2  10  4
FURNITURE  AND  FIXTURES  25  15  9  24  15
PAPER  ANO  AWED  PRODUCTS  26  20  18  31  29
PUBUSHING  AND  PRINTING  27  7  9  12  15
CHEMICALS  AND  ALLIEO  PROOUCTS  28  19  7  27  13-
PETROLEUM  AND  COAL  PRODUCTS  29  38  34  66  53
RUBBER  AND  MISCELLANEOUS  PLASTICS  PROD.  39  13  17  Ia  28
LEATHER  AND  LEATHER  PRODUCTS  31  12  13  18  20
STONE.  CLAY,  AND  GLASS  PRODUCTS  32  19  2  27  4
PRIMARY  METAL  INDUSTRIES  33  20  10  30  30
FABRICATED  METAL  PRODUCTS  34  6  16  10  23
INDUSTRIAL  MACHINERY  AND  EQUIPMENT  35  18  9  24  14
ELECTRICAL  AND  OTHER  ELECTRONIC  EQUIP.  36  19  11  27  19
TRANSPORTATION  EQUIPMENT  37  38  35  52  43
INSTRUMENTS  AND  RELATEO  PROOUCTS  30  23  14  40  25
MISCELLANEOUS  MANUFACTURING  INOUSTRIES  39  4  7  7  12
SOurces  U.S.  Census  Bureau  Company  Summary  (19171  and  PlanEcon  datL
Table  prepared  by  A.  Brawn,  S.  Ickes.  and  R.  Ryterman.
55Table  15. Measures  of Industrial  Concentration  of Finms  in Russia  fOr  1989
Value  of  Statistic  for  lndusides  I  in  the  Following  Decilas  of  Faur-rirm  Concantrarion  Ratios  of  EA&PLOYMENT
Afeasure  of
Concentraton  SOafista  1solS0  111020%  21  to30%  311o  40%  41  to  505  51  to  60%  61  to  70%  711io  60%  81  to  90%  St  to  100%  Total
Number  el Industries  20  31  37  27  31  36  33  38  28  125  406
Percent  of  Frequency  4.9  7.8  L.1  6.7  7.6  8.9  9.1  9.4  6.9  30.8
all  Industiles  Cumulative  4.0  12.6  21.7  28.3  36.0  44.e  53.0  62.3  69.2  100.0
llumber  of  Firms  10153  4193  2483  1114  713  663  405  422  212  333  21319
Percent  of  Frequienicy  50.3  19.6  11.6  5.2  3.3  3.2  2.3  2.0  1.0  1.8
all  Firms  Cumulative  50.3  69.9  81.5  __  13.7  90.0  93.2  95.5  97.5  96.4  100.0
Number  of  Employees  2944198  2232027  2033250  1868026 741955  1530517 628866 662479 666221  444240  13751839
Percent  of  Frequency  21.4  16.2  14.8  13.6  5.4  11.1  4.6  4.0  4.8  3.2
all  Employees  Cumulative  21.4  37.6  52.4  65.0  71.4  62.5  67.1  91.9  96.6  100.0
Percent  of  Frequency  11.2  19.6  7.7  27.9  6.0  10.2  4.0  6.1  4.2  2.9 441320.4
all  Sales  . Cumulative  11.2  30.8  30.5  66.4  72.4  82.6  86.6  92.7  96.9  100.0
LA
Value  of  Staltistic  for  Indusiries  ' n the  following  Deciles  ol  Fourfirm  Concentration  Ratios  of  SALES
Aleasuy,  of
Concentration  Stallstic  0  to  10% II  to20% 21 o130%  311040%  41  to  E0%  511060%  61  to  70%  71aO  80%  811090%  Sito  100%  Total
Number  of  lodusltles  14  19  34  29  30  28  31  41  43  137  406
Percent  of  Frequency  3.4  4.7  9.4  7.1  7.4  6.9  7.6  10.1  10.6  33.7
all  Industries  Cumulative  3.4  8.1  16.5  23.0  31.0  31.9  45.6  55'7  66.3  100.0
Number  of  Firnis  0576  4515  2691  1484  1419  603  516  726  442  419  21319
Percent  of  Frequency  40.1  21.1  12.6  6.9  6.8  2.8  2.4  3.4  2.1  2.0
all  Firms  Cumulalive  40.1  61.2  73.8  80.7  97.3  90.2  92.8  96.0  98.0  100.0
Number  of  Employees  2664951  1476631  1902195  1270028  2126020 65241l 1051921 901732  1005634 500268  13751839
Petcent  of  Frequency  19.4  10.7  13.8  9.Z  15.5  6.2  7.6  6.6  7.3  3.8
all  Employees  Cumulative  12.4  30.1  43.9  53.1  68.6  74.6  82.5  89.1  95.4  100.0
Percent  of  Frequency  21.3  5.0  6.4  21.0  16.4  5:3  7.1  5.4  8.9  3.1 441320.4
all  Sales  Cumulative  21.3  26.3  32.7  53.1  70.1  75.4  82.5  87.9  96.8  100.0
'Indusities  are  measured  at  the  4-diglt  SIC  level.
Four-lirm  concentration  altiOs  ere  the  sum  of  the  statistic  for  the  four  largest  firms  as  a percent  of  the  total  of  the  stalislic  for  the  industry.
Table  prepared  4y  A.  Brown,  B.  Ickes.  and  n.  Ryterman.Table  16. Distribution  of U.S.  and Russian  Manufacturing  Industries  by  Four-Firm  Ratias
All Ratiosby Sales
Four  *Firm
Concentration  Percentage  of  all  Percentap  of  Percentae  Perantp  of
Ratio  Range  Number  of  Industries  Industries  Tota  value  added  of Output  Employment
U.S.  Russia  U.S.  Russio  U.S.  Russi  Rusia
0.19  86  25  19.2  7.1  21.7  18.7  28.8
20-39  163  52  36.4  14.9  38.8  17.2  24.0
40459  120  46  26.8  13.1  19.7  33.3  222
60-79  56  68  12.5  1rq.4  14.9  16.3  13.2
80.100  23  159  5.1  45.4  4.9  14.6  11.8
Total  448  350  100  100  100  100  100
Bassian  Ratios  by Employment
Four  -Firm
Concentration  Pecenage  of Ill  Percentage  of  Percentage  Percentage  of
Raio  Range  Number  of Industries  Industries  Tal  value  added  of Output  Employment
U.S.  Russia  U.S.  Russia  US.  Russia  Russia
0-19  86  39  19.2  11.1  21.7  24.1  37.0
20-39  163  56  36.4  16.0  38.8  35.7  30.5
40-59  120  56  20.8  16.0  19.7  lS.0  13.4
50.79  56  63  12.5  19.0  14.9  11.3  9.8
800100  23  136  5.1  38.9  4.9  10.9  9.2
TotaI  448  350  100  100  100  100  100
U.S.  data  are  for 1982  and  ara  establishment  data.
Sources:  Scherer  and  Ross  11990,  p.831  and  PlanEcon  data
Table  prepared  by  A.  Brown.  8.  Ilckes,  and  R.  Rytenman
57Table  17. Frequency  of Firms  by  Firm-Indusury  and  Concentration  Ratlo
Number  of  Firms  Incidence  of  Firms  in  Indus_ties  with  the  Following  Four-Firm  Concentration  Ratios  of  Employment
in  industry  0lto  100%  81  to  90%  71  to 80% B1  to 70% 61  to  80%  41  to  50% 31  to 40% 21  to 30% 11  to 20%  0  to OV%  Total
1  43  a  a  0  0  U  a  0  0  0  43
2  48  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  48
3  57  0  0  0  O  O  O  .0  0  0  57 3  __________  ______________________  . ____
4  84  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  84
Ln  _
5 to 10  101  175  181  72  69  0  a  0  0  0  598
lto2O  0  37  212  204  239  282  60  0  0  0  1134
21  to50  0  0  29  .119  286  421  671  498  so  0  2014
51  to iOO-  0  0  0  0  89  0  338  1335  528  96  2382
>  10.0  0  0  0  0  0  0  147  650  3577  10657  15031
Total  333  212  422  485  683  713  1114  2483  4193  10753  21391
1ndustries  are  measured  at the  4.diglt  SIC  level.
Thealour*lirm  concentration  ratio  is  the  employment  In  the  four  largest  firms  as  a percont  of total  employment  in  the  Industry.
Table  prepared  by  A.  Brown,  B.  Ickos,  and  R.  Ryterman.Table  18. Sales  Concentration  Ratios  for  Representative  Industries
for  the  United  States  (1987)  and  Russia.(1989)
4&Firm  bEe  8 irm  Ratio  |Nubsr  of  Firm.
S1C Code  Industry  Descriptien  U.S.  Ruia  I  U.S.  Susie  lU..  Rusio
2067  Chewing  gum  96  10o  8
33310  Ptimary  copper'  92  54  120  85  7  12
2111  Cigarenes  92  30  IDI  59  9  24
3641  Electric  lamps  S1  77  94  94  93  12
3711  Passengercars  90  84  95  90  352  10
2043  Cereal  breakfast  foods  17  99  33
2082  BOr  and  malt  beverages  07  13  98  22  101  237
3632  Household  frif  eortors  and  freezers  i5  98  40
3211  Ratcans  82  63  (DI  74  65  29
3511  Turbines  and  tumibe  generators  90  91  35  99  68  10
3221  Glass  containers  7  33  u9  53  35  36
3334  Primry  aluminum  74  66  95  92  34  11
3721  Aircraft  72  92  137
3011  Tres  and  inner  tubes  69  60  87  92  114  10
2841  Soap  and  detergents  E5  76  76  95  683  11
3691  Storage  batteries  64  57  78  81  125  13
3562  Ball  and  roller  bearings  59  53  69  84  113  19
3411  MetaI  cans  54  100  70  100  161  2
2822  Synthetic  rubber  50  65  76  92  55  10
3144  Women's  footwear,  excpt  athledic  50  61  123
(3140)  Footwear  25  37  111
3523  Farm  machinery  and  equipment  45  42  52  59  1576  147
3312  BlasxfumaacesandsteelniUls  44  46  63  71  271  36
2041  Rour  and  other  grain  mils  44  14  63  23  237  235
n11  Cotton  weaving  niuls  42  18  59  28  246  122
3574  Seniconductors  40  100  59  100i  755  2
3651  Household  audio  and  video  equip.  39  1WO  59  100  360  1
3621  Motors  nd  generators  36  30  49  49  349  48
2051  Bread.  cake,  and  related  products  34  8  47  11  1948  1467
3965  Fasteners  buttons.  etc.  33  80  43  92  247  16
2873  Nitrigenous  ferlizer  33  49  55  79  117  13
2911  Petroleum  refining  32  42  52  65  200  ,  31
3541  Metal-cutting  machine  tools  31  28  41  46  381  51
2066  Bottled  and  canned  soft  drinks  30  33  40  45  646  76
3241  Portland  cement  28  24  47  **40  123  42
2851  Paints  and  allied  products  27  74  40  84  1121  .61
2653  Corrugated  and  sold  fiber  boxes  26  10D  41  100  952  4
2711  Newspapers  25  54  39  65  7473  32
2834  Pharmaceutical  preparations  22  33  36  52  640  63
2026  Fluid  ilk  *  21  10  32  15  652  472
3552  Textile  machinery  20  57  30  81  475  17
3452  Screw  machine  products  16  99  24  100  834  5
2421  Sawmills  nd  planning  nils  is  210  21  32  5252  199
3273  Ready-mixed  concrete  8  28  11  45  3749  40
2335  _Wmensandmisses'  dresses  6  100  10  100  5398  3
U.S.  da  are  establishment  dna.
IDI  Withheld  to  avoid  discDsing  data  for  individual  cnvt  anies.
*U.S.  statistics  are  for  1982  from  Scherer  and  Ross
Sources  Scherer  and  Ross  11990.  p.  771.  U.S.  Burmau  of  Census  1987  Concentration  Ratios  in  Manufacturing,  and  PlanEcon  date
Table  Oreoared  by  A. Brown.  B.  Ickes.  and  R.  Rvternan  59'Table  19. Frequency  of Dominant  Firms  within  Industies in Russia  in 1989
#as  %  of  su  as  %  of
Measured  in employmert  # of fimns nat'l  total  nat'l  sum
National
Fimrs  with > -35%  of market  in  their  industry  . 173  0.81  3.8
Of  those,  firms  in  industries  where  only
ons  firm  has more  than  35%  135  0.63  3.5
Regional
Finns  with > -35%  of market  in  their  industry  2122  9.92  34.9
Of  those,  firms  in  industries  where  only
one  firm  has more  than  35%  1634  7.64  27.8
Measured in sales
National
Firms  with > -35%  of market  in  their  industry  203  0.95  7.6
Of  those,  finms  in  industries  where  only
one  firm  has  mare  than  35%  163  0.76  6.7
Regional
Firms  with > -35%  of market  in  their  industry  2189  10.23  37.9
Of  those,  fims in  industries  where  only
one  firm  has  more  than  35%  1751  8.19  30.8
*Industry  is measured  at the  four-digit  SIC  level.
Table  prepared  by  A.  Brown,  B. Ickes,  and  R.  Ryteman.
60Table  20. Concentration  Characteristics  of Firms  by  Industrial  Branches  in Russia  In 1989
FIRMS  with > - 35%;  Employment  Share  In their  4dig1t  Int,  INDUSTRIES  wlth  firms with > -35%  Employment  Shares
As  ftarof  As  Sharo1  of  In  Ind  #of 4digit  As  Shaerof #firms  In  AiShaerof  As  Share  of
Branch  #Fi  rms  Branch  irs  BaeEm  wt  only  I  Indusre  #lofInd  Bronch  Ind  theso  Ind  Branch  Firms  Branch  Em
Agricultuie'  5  0.3  0.4  3  8  4  50.0  is  1.2  0.5
Apparel  10  12  3,3  8  19  a  421  26  31  4.6
Chemicals  5  11  50  6  27  5  I  35  77  113
Construction'  0  0.0  0.0  a  I  a  0.0  0  0.0  0.0
Food  7  011  0  5  B  35  B  17.1  10  0.2  0.6
Furniture  4  1.0  0.4  P  9  4  44.4  6  1.5  0.5
Ind  M&E  Is  1.5  6.2  14  44  Is  34.1  93  8.5  11.2
Lumber  4  0.2  0.3  2  14  3  21.4  4  0.2  0.3
Mining'  12  1.8  10.9  12  27  12  44.4  94  14.2  22.9
Miscellanuour  8  2.2  5.1  a  16  a  50.0  31  8.7  8.7
Petruleum  2  2.4  1  2  2  5  2  40.0  11  13.4  2.5
Primary  Metal  10  4.4  3.3  8  19  9  47.4  25  11.1  5.3
Printino  9  0.6  4.0  7  13  a  61.5  30  2.1  8.8
Rubber  4  2.3  1.1  2  10  3  30.0  a  3.4  1.2
Services'  0  0.0  0.0  0  11  0  0.0  0  0.0  0.0
Sltone  C&G  ,  0.3  1.5  4  26  5  19.2  40  2.0  3.5
Textile  10  1.7  2.5  6  21  6  39.1  27  4.5  4.3
Tobacco  2  7.1  3.4  2  3  2  69.7  4  14.3  4.5
Transpart  Equip  3  0.9  1.7  3  9  3  33.3  10  2.9  3.2
Trinspattatian'  I  0.1  0.1  1  a  1  16.7  1  0.1  0.1
Others  3  42.9  77.9  3  3  3  100.0  7  100.0  100.0
'Non-manufaclur  ing  branches.




irantec  Central  Chernotem  E  Siberia  Far  East  Kaliningrad  N  Caucasus  North  Northwest  Urtals  Velga  Vyatka  W  Siberis Total  E
Agriolturst*  i0.9.  3.3  6.9  18.3  8.?  4.5  17.0  2.6  10.2  5.7  5.8  5.3
0.E  1.1  1.9  7.1  23.7  0.9  5.6  0.9  1.1  0.8  1.5  0.9  1.6
Apparel  '29.6  4.2  3.9  3.6  0.5  13.7  . 2.4  6.8  10.7  10.3  7.6  6.6
4.7  3.2  2.5  3.1  2.9  6.9  1.8  4.9  2.7  3.5  4.4  2.7  3.8
Chamicahs  21.6  5.9  5.5  0.D  0.0  1.7  1.4  4.8  13.0  19.5  9.4  10.5
4.5  6.6  4.5  1.0  0.2  4.3  1.4  4.3  4.3  8.51  7.1  __  5.5  4.9
Construction'  16.8  4.2  3.8  4.1  0.5  3.0  14.3  6.0  8.2  4.1  3.5  31.3
0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.4  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.4  0.1
Eleelroriles  24.1  9.5  4.1  1.2  1.0  8.5  0.1  8,6  13.3  9.3  11.6  10.6
3.3  8.1  2.2  0.9  5.4  2.4  0.0  5.3  2.9  2.7  5.0  3.7  3.2
Fabricated  Metal  21.6  7,2  3.9  3.2  0.0  10.1  0.9  12.4  15.4  9,2  9.4  6.8
_______  __  2.6  4.0  1.9  2.0  0.0  _  3.2  0.5  6.6  2.9  2.3  4.0  2.0  *  2.8
Food  17.3  8.8  4.7  8.7  0.8  14.5  3.6  4.6  10.5  11.3  5.3  9.6
_______________  7.1  16.9  7.6  19.3  12.6  15.9  7.4  8.4  6.7  9.7  7.9  9.5  9.6
Furniture  25.1  3.6  5.1  3.7  0.6  17.6  3.3  5.1  8.4  9.0  6.6  8.8
1.8  1.2  1.4  1.4  2.1  3.4  1.1  2.8  0.9  . 1.4  1.7  1.6  1.7
Ind  M&E  . 27.3  6.7  2.8  1.6  0.4  10.5  2.1  5.9  15.5  13.4  5.4  8.4
15.8  18.2  6.4  4.9  6.2  16.3  5.8  15.3  14.1  16.3  11.3  12.2  13.6
Instruments  43.0  1.8  1.7  0.5  0.6  8.8  0.1  8.5  8.9  14.3  6.2  5.71
3.7  0.7  0.0  0.2  1.9  2.0  0.0  3.3  1.2  2.6  1.9  1.2  2.0
Leathar  2S,8  5.6  2.8  2.3  0  .4  13.3  1.0  9.3  13.86  11.6  6.4  6.0
1.EI  1.9  0.6  0.9  1.2 _  2.0  0.3  3.0  1.6  1.0  2.2  1.1  I.7
Lumbar  11.7  0.9  16.7  6.1  0.3  2.6  19.2  4.5  14.6  4.4  7.7  9.1
3.4  1.3  19.1  12.5  3.7  2.0  26.1  5.9  6.6  2.7  5.0  6.6  6.8
Mining  6.8  3.4  9.5  7.6  0.2  IIA  10.6  2.2  18.3  3.7  0.8  25.6
2.3  5.4  12.8  14.1  3.0  10.5  17.1  3.4  9.9  2.61  1.0  22.1  8.0
Miscellaneous  37.1  2.2  2.1  1.0  0.0  10.3  4.1  10.0  11.4  4.5  14.2  3.1
2.1  0.6  0.5  0.3  0.0  1.5  1.1  !  2.5  1.0  0.5  2.8  0.4  1.3
a.,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1.3Table  21  Cant.
Shari o1
Otanvh  Cenlral  Chernozem E  Sibetla  Far  East  Kallningrad N  Caucasus North  Northwest  Urals  Vel  Vyatka  W Siheria  Total  E
Paper  14.1  0.7  11.4  6.9  4.6  1.8  25.0  12.5  11.8  4.4  6.2  0.6  --
__________O.9  _0.2  _2.7  2.1  10.9  0.3  7.2  3.4  1.1  0.6  1.4  0.1  _1.4|
Petroleum  14.2.  0.1  14.5  1.8  0.0  8.3  0.8  3.2  28A4  14.8  5.1  8.8
0.l  -0.0  2.4  0.4  0.0  0.9  0.1  0.6  1.9  1.3  0.8  0.9  1.0
Primary  Metal  15.0  6.8  4.3  1.5  0.0  3.1  5.8  1.5  43.3  5.1  4.3  9.4
___________  3.9  6.3  4,5  _2.1  0.4  2.2  _  _7.1  _  1.;  17.7  2.1  4.1  6.2 _  6.1
Plinliiig  41.3  3.3  3.1  3.2  0.5  6.7  2.7  9.6  10.6  8.6  3.6  8.3
1.8  0.7  0.5  0.8  0.9  0.8  0.1  1.9  0.8  0.8  0.6  0.7  1.0
Rubber  29.0  8.1  2.8  0.5  0.0  5.9  0.2  68.8  .2  20.0  5.9  10.9
___________2.E  3.2  0.9  0.2  0.0  1.3  0.1  3.4  1.1  3.6  1.8  2.3  2.0
Serwice.,  25.6  4.3  6.8  5.0  OA  .10.5  2.1  5.3  15.9  10.1:  4.6  9.4
3.1  2.4  3.3  3.3  1.8  3.4  1.2  2.9  3.0 _  2.6  2.0  2.8  2.8
Slone  C&C  26.5  5.7  8.0  4.8  0.3  9.1  3.3  6.7  14.5  . 11.6  4.6  8.9
__________  _8.1  8.5  7.8  6.3  4.0  7.e  4.9  8.1  7.3  7.8  5.3  7.2  7.5
TextIl  e  55.2  3.2  4.0  0.7  0.3  7.3  1.3  5.3  6.5  7.8  4.1  4.2
.14.  3.9  4.2  1.1  3.2  5.2  1.8  6.3  2.7  4.3  4.0  2.8  8.2
Tobacco  23.7  10.5  2.2  0.0  0.0  18.2  0.0  13.5  8.1  7.8'  0.2  7.7
0.1  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.01  0.3  0.1  O.1  0.0  0.1  0.1
Transport  Equip  25.5  1.9  3.6  3.7.  0.9  4.8  2.2  1.7  1OA  47.1  15.7  2.6
7.9  2.7  4.4  6.1  11,3  4.0  3.2  2.4  5.0  17.6  17.5  2.0  7.2
Transportation  15.2  4.3  11.9  9.1  0.4  6.7  7.4  '3.5  14.6  10.2  5.1  11.7
2.3  3.1  7.2  7.5  2.2  2.6.  5.4  2.4  3.5  3.3  2.8  4.5  3.6
Othets  38.1  0  .0  0.  0.  0.0  . 30.2  0.0  .0  0  68.  13.8  0.0  8.5
___________0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.a  0  .0  _  0.0  D.0  0.O  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Share  of  total  E  23.4  5.0  6.9  4.3  0.6  897  5.0  5.2  14.9  11.2  6.5  9.3  IOO.D
'Non-manulacturlng  branches.
Table  prapated  by  A.  Brown,  S.  Ickes,  and  R.  Rytorman.
a'~~
wTable  22.  Measures  of Industrial  Concentration  Across  Regions  In  Russia  for  1989
Firm-lndustries'  Firm-lndustries
Region  StalTistic  1  <-4  Region  Statistic  1  <-4
Central  %  of Industiles  19.0  49A  North  %  of  IndustrIes  39.2  68.4
Yof  Firms  1.4  7.6  %  of Firms  4.7  14.2
%  of  Employment  1.7  19.9  %  of  Employment  19.8  36.9
Chernozem  %  of  Indusities  38.8  71.3  Northwest  %  of  industries  37.0  77.2
%  of  Firms  5.9  19.1  %  of  Firms  8.5  30.9
%  of Employment  15.5  49.0  %  of  Employment  17A  52.0
E.  Siberia  %  of  Industries  40.1  73.1  UralS  %  of  Industries  27.1  61.0
X of  Firms  4.R  15.1  Y of  Firms  3.0  13.2
%  of  Employment  10.7  38.7  %  of  Employment  8.2  29.5
Fat  East  X of  Industiies  42.1  70.1  Volga  %  of  Industries*  27.5  63.0
X  of  Firms  5.6  15.0  X  of  Firms  3.0  14.1
X  of  Enployment  12.4  24.3  X  of  Employment  7.3  41.1
Keliningrad %  of  Industries  62.1  84.8  V  Vyatka  X  of  Industries  38.8  71.1
X of  Firms  27.0  62.8  X of  Firms  5.3  18.6
X of  Employment  26.3  70.5  X  of  Employment  15.1  52.5
N.  Caucasus  X of  Industries  33.1  55.7  W.  Siberia %  of  Indusiries  32.2  65.2
X of Firms  3.9  14.1  X of Firms  3.7  13.9
X  of  Employment  B.9  25.3  %  of Employment  8.5  29.5
Column  lists  the  value  of  the  statistic  for  industries  with  the  given  number  oa  firms  in  that  industry  in  that  region.
Industries  are  measured  at  the  4-digit  SIC  level.
Table  prepared  by  A.  Brown,  B.  Ickes,  and  R.  Ryterman.Table  23. Geographic  Distribution  of Firms  and  Industries  in Russia  fot 1989
Value  of Statistic  for OBLAST$  fn Each  of the  Foalowing  Decfils'
Unit  Statistic  1  2  3  4  6  a  7  8  9  10  Total
Firma  Mean  67.6  129.3  177.0  203.5  232.3  263.7  304.8  379.9  439.4  655.3
Minimum  27  98  157  l8e  221  247  288  340  404  517  27
Maximum  97  155  187  217  244  277  328  402  507  898  898
Range  70  57  30  29  23  30  40  62  103  381  871
Industries  Mean  33.5  55.5  63.1  69.8  81.6  85.7  95.0  114.5  128.6  179.8
Minimum  18  44  60  07  77  89  91  106  125  135  18
Maximum  41  B0  B8  74  85  91  103  123  132  234  234
Range  23  16  a  7  a  .5  12  17  7  99  216
Value  of Siatlstif forCIT/ESin  Ehch  of the  Following  oDed11s
Unlt StatIstin  1  2  3  4  5  0  7  9  9  10  Total
Firma  Mean  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.3  2.0  3.0  4.5  7.2  105.0
Minimum  1  1  I  1  1  2  Z  4  5  9  1
Maximum  1  1  I  1  2  2  4  5  9  768  788
Range  0  0  0  0  1  0  2  1  4  759  767
Industries  Mean  1  1  1  1  1.2  2  2.9  4.4  0.9  54.1
Minlmum  1  1  1  1  1  2  2  4  5.  9  1
Maximum  1  1  1  1  2  2  4  5  9  234  234
Range  0  0  0  0  1  0  2.  1  4  225  233
Industries  are  measured  at  the  4-diglt  SIC  level.
Each  decile  contaTns  10  percent  of  Russian  cities  or  ablasts  ranging  from  smallest  to  largest  based  on  the  unit  of  observation  being  analysed.
For  example,  when  analyzing  the  geographic  distribution  oa  firms  In  cities,  cities  are  ranked  based  an  their  totil  number  oa  firms.
Table  prepared  by  A.  Brown,  B.  Iekes.  and  R.  Ryterman.Table  24.  Characteristics  of Firms  in Russian  Cities  by  Firm  and  Industry  Concentration  for  1989
Value  of  St tittic  for Cilia.  wiih  the  Foliowing  lNmter  of  FIRMS
Attrliute  Statistil  1  2  3  4  6tol  11  ta 20  2Itc  90  61to  100 101  to  200  >200
Nwnmbr  4f Total  Clik  . Number  2097  576  356  292  693  228  92  33  15  2
Poment  of  Total  Citles  Frequercy  47.9  13.2  9.1  8.4  15.8  6.2  2.1  0.8  0.3  0
Cumulative  47.9  81.1  69.3  75.7  91.6  96.9  98.9  99.6  I00  100
Number  ofloslFlmim  Numbef  2097  1152  1069  1128  4660  3246  2760  2334  1632  1114
Poecent  of  Toltl  Firma  Frequency  9.9  6.4  6.0  5.3  21.8  15.2  12.9  I0.9  98.  5.2
Cuniuf  liv.  9.8  16.2  20.2  25.5  47.2  82.4  75.3  96.2  94.9  tOO
EmploymentbyFrlms  Men  335.9  319.2  286.7  274.3  361.2  659.3  1030.8  940.0  1108.B  1051.2
(numbeor)  Median  179  90  64  62  76  122  148  128  213  645
Minimum  I  1  3  1  1  1  2  4  5  9
Meximum  7157  6511  17784  40960  25525  30t92  99980  33235  10605  59379
Reng  7156  8510  17781  40959  25524  30091  99959  33231  100600 58371
Varilane  209203  424810  959389  1919212  1014338 2890801 13736589 U95489  12880984 5450188
Caef  Var  138.2  204,2  341.6  491.8  278.9  267.9  359.8  226.8  320.9  222.1
Ori  Peceint  of Total  Frequeney  6.1  2.7  2.2  22  12.2  i  15.6  20.7  IC.0  14.8  8.5
Employment  Cumulative  5.1  7.8  10.0  12.2  24.4  40.0  60.7  78.7  91.5  108.0
Value  of  Sfo  tutu  for  Citl J H'th th Folo  Wing  Numberof  INDUSTRIES
Attribute  Statitle  1  2  3  4  to 10  11to20  21to60  S1  to 100  OlOto200  >200
Numbor  of  Tatil  Cilhs  Number  2125  573  359  291  690  228  el  36  1  1
Percent  of  Total  Ciltie  Frequency  48.8  13  8.2  8.4  15.9  5.2  1.9  0.8  0  0
Cumulative  48.6  61.7  69.9  78.3  92.1  97.3  99.1  100  100  100
Number  of TolFinmn  Number  215S  1169  1105  1151  4791  3499  2947  3470  348  769
Percent  of  Total  Firms  Froquency  10.1  5.5  5.2  5.4  22.4  16.3  13.8  16.2  1.0  3.6
Cumulaltlv  10.1  15.5  20.7  28.1  49.5  64.9  73.8  94.9  96.4  100
Employment  by  Flims  Mean  336.7  338.4  283.7  276.0  370.0  693.6  101?.9  1055.0  1115.9  1022.1
(number)  Medlin  182  65  82  61  78  123  123  178  1047  242
Minimum  I  1  3  .1  1  1  2  4  10  8
Maximum  7157  16930  17784  40960  25525  32348  99960  100605  13354  59379
Ringo  7159  18929  17781  40959  25524  32347  99959  100601  13344  59371
Vauiance  205945  701343  638042  1805830  1013561 3289613 12741143 9147E80  2622892 8726288
Coalf  Vr  134.8  247.5  302.9  489.9  272.9  261.9  350.7  286.6  145.1  253.7
Poercnt  of  Total  Frequency  6.3  2.9  2.1  2.3  12.9  17.8  21.8  26.6  2.9  5.7
Employment  Cumulative  5.3  8.2  10.3  12.6  26.5  43.1  64.9  91.6  94.3  100.0
Table  prupared  by  A.  Brown,  B.  Ickes,  and  R.  Ryterman.Table  25. Employment  Size  of Firms  In  Cities  by Firm  Concentration  ir Russia  for  1989
Value  of tho  Statistic  for  Cities  with  tho  following  Numher  ofFirms
1  2  3  4  Sto  11  11  to20  21to50 51tol0  101tto200  >200  Total
Number  of  Cities  2097  578  356  282  693  228  92  33  15  2  4374
Number  Size  by
of  Firma Employment
Small  1105  737  802  962  3105  1465  986  728  447  204  10319
IE  <  2001
Medium  866  340  215  217  1215  1335  1392  1129  968  592  8269
(200<-E<  10001
Large  126  75  49  48  330  421  469  460  400  312  2690
11000<  -E<  100001
Extra  Large  0  0  2  1  10  25  33  19  17  6  113
(E  < -100001
Total  2097  1152  1066  1128  4660  3248  2760  2334  1932  1114  21391
Tabl  prepared  by  A.  Brown,  B.  Ickes,  and  R.  Ryterman.Table  26. Frequency  of  Firms  by  Industrial  Concentration  Classes  in Cities  By  Firm  Concentration  Classes
Number  of firms  Firm  Frequency  In  Cities  with  the  Following  Number  of Firms
in  industry  1  2  3  4  to 10  Ill  to20  21  to  50 61  to 100  101  to 200  > 200  Total
1  3  2  1  0  6  a  5  6  4  10  43
2  4  1  0  2  1  11  6  3  7  13  48
3  2  1  0  0  6  7  13  4  9  15  57
4  7  0  3  2  16  13  14  9  6  14  84
5to lo  43  14  15  9  67  83  89  85  78  115  598
11to20  93  43  24  24  148  166  182  149  173  134  1134
21  to  50  147  69  43  47  270  288  306  349  311  194  2014
51  to 100  231  99  78  88  381  310  364  376  282  173  2382
> 100  1687  933  904  958  3767  2362  1781  1353  962  445 15031
>  Total  2097  1152  1068  1128  4660  3248  2760  2334  1832  1114  21391
4*Firm  Concen  Firm  frequency  in  Cities  with  the  Following  Number  of  Firms
tration  Ratio  1  2  3  4  5tolO  llto20  21to50 Sito  100  lOlto200  >200  Total
91  to lOO%  23  B  5  5  33  51  48  37  42  85  333
81 to90%  17  12  B  6  28  24  32  30  t28  31  212
71  to 80%  29  11  7  6  G8  55  68  51  55  72  422
G1  to 70%  43  13  17  13  63  78  62  71  67  58  485
51  to60%  50  24  18  19  79  108  117  110  87  73  683
41 to50%  65  34  16  12  g0  87  112  105  125  68  713
31 to40%  109  34  25  42  173  171  182  167  161  70  1114
21 to30%  176  58  el  45  309  323  422  469  383  237  2483
11  to20%  384  184  120  147  732  745  684  596  411  194  4193
Oto 10%  1191  798  788  833  3087  160B  1055  698  473  226  10753
Total  2097  1152 1068 1128  4660  3245  2760  2334  1832  1114  21391
the  four-firm  concentration  ratio  Is  the  employment  in  the  four  largest  firms  as  a percent  of  total  employment  in  the  industry.
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